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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The development of new methodologies and technologies for data collection and 
analysis has led to an increased emphasis on project evaluation. However, most 
evaluation studies concentrate on projects in developed countries. Because of the lack of 
financial and professional resources, project evaluation in developing countries is often 
done poorly or not done at all. The resulting lack of information on project success may 
lead to ineffective implementation or expansion of projects, which can result in wasteful 
use of scarce public resources. 
The main purpose of this study is to apply evaluation methods widely adopted in 
developed countries to two projects in a developing country. While it is widely 
recognized that randomized experimental design is the most accurate method for project 
evaluation, it is not feasible in many cases due to financial and administrative difficuhies 
in developing countries. A recent study (John Newman et al. 1994) reports that analyses 
using randomized experimental design are "not only feasible but also yield the most 
robust results." They discuss seven case studies with simple randomized experimental 
designs to support their conclusion. This study applies the method to educational projects 
in Pakistan. The first project evaluation case study is urban girls' fellowship school pilot 
project implemented in Quetta, the largest city in Balochistan province of Pakistan. The 
second study analyzes the impact of the community support girls' school project in rural 
districts of Balochistan. To test the robustness of alternative evaluation methods, different 
evaluation methods are used. These include reflexive comparison, matched comparison, 
randomized control, and cross-sectional and first-differenced econometric analyses. Both 
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of the studies suggest that expansions of the pilot projects are likely to be successful. 
Measured program effects in the two case studies are not sensitive to the differences 
in evaluation methods. In the urban girls' fellowship case study, six different methods are 
applied, and all of the results show that the fellowship program led to sharp increases of 
enrollment for both boys and girls. The positive effect of the program is verified in the 
cohort-specific sample as well as the age-specific sample, implying that initial gains in 
enrollment persist over time. 
The program effects in the community support girls' school project are the same as 
those in the urban case study. The community support program led to increases of 
enrollment for both boys and girls. The enrollment growth for rural girls was similar to 
that of urban girls, but the increase for boys was smaller than that in the urban fellowship 
program. The results are not substantially altered when alternative evaluation methods are 
applied. 
Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation has been organized so that a general introduaion and literature 
review precede two manuscripts with a general conclusions section following. The 
general conclusions section summarizes the results and discussions, and provides 
suggestions for further research. The appendix includes additional tables which provide 
supplementary analyses of the two impact evaluation studies. All references cited are 
listed after the appendix. 
The two manuscripts have been written according to specifications for submission to 
the World Bank Working Paper Series on Impact Evaluation Reforms. The first 
manuscript is entitled "Can Private School Subsidies Increase Schooling for the Poor?: 
The Quetta Urban Fellowship Program." The second manuscript is entitled "Can Cultural 
Barriers Be Overcome in Girls' Schooling?: The Community Support Program in Rural 
Balochistan. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Even though some literature on evaluation research dates back to the seventeenth 
century, the literature on systematic, evaluation based on data analysis is relatively new. 
The evolution of evaluation methodology has made rapid progress, due not only to the 
need of accurate measure of effectiveness of socio-economic programs corresponding to 
the rapid pace of socio-economic changes, but also to technological progress. In 
particular, dramatic improvements in computer technology have made it possible for 
evaluation research to be performed at lower cost in both time and money. 
Modem data-based evaluation became widespread in the mid-sixties. Before then, 
evaluations seldom went beyond a verbal description of how the programs were enacted 
and how they performed. Nevertheless, there were isolated examples of methods 
typically used in modem evaluations. For example, the so-called "before-and-after" study, 
which is widely employed currently has its roots in the 1930's. Roethlisberger and 
Dickson( 1939) found that a worker's produaivity rises with any change in the intensity of 
illumination. 
Qualitative vs. Quantitative Approaches 
Nowadays, the need for evaluation as a part of the policy process is widely 
recognized. However, there is little consensus on appropriate evaluation methodology. 
Several methodologies have been developed, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. No single method is universally preferred. One issue is whether to use a 
5 
qualitative or quantitative methodology. The advantage of qualitative methods is that they 
offer more detail than quantitative methods. Since qualitative methods are usually based 
upon interviews with project participants, they may capture more detailed information. 
The most serious problem with qualitative evaluation is that it is inherently subjective. 
Different researchers could fail to reach the same conclusion even if they used the same 
methodologies on the same individuals. Another drawback with qualitative approaches is 
that it is too costly to gather data sets large enough to get significant results. Generally, 
qualitative approaches are used in the design and monitoring of projects, while 
quantitative approaches are appropriate for estimating net impacts. 
Mixed approaches are often used in practice. A Brookings field evaluation of a job 
creation program in 1981 is a good example of linking qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. The U.S. Department of Labor used a quantitative method with aggregate 
data to compare government employment before and after the introduaion of public 
service employment. They concluded that the program may have created about 50% more 
jobs. However, Brookings researchers who performed a qualitative evaluation found that 
public employment would have been lower without the program, so the evaluation by the 
U.S. Department of Labor may have underestimated the effect of the program.' From this 
example, we can learn that a quantitative approach can provide a more accurate measure 
of program effects when it is supplemented by detailed information from a qualitative 
research. 
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Microsimulation 
Another methodology often used for project evaluation is a microsimulation 
approach. The advantage of this approach is that it can provide estimated costs and 
benefits for a project, which can guide the decision on whether implementation is 
warranted. Since this approach is easier and cheaper, it has been widely adopted in 
various fields. For example, in the 1975-1976 food stamp debate, the 1977 aborted Defter 
Jobs and Income proposal, the 1984 - 1986 tax reform debate, and most recently in the 
welfare reform debate, the microsimulation approach has been applied. 
The following steps used for the microsimulation of policy changes on food stamp 
program costs illustrate the method. First, Current Population Survey(CPS) data was 
modified to make it compatible with the simulation model. Additional data on public 
assistance programs which may affect food stamp eligibility on simulated after-tax 
income which determines eligibility were added. Then, food stamp usage was simulated 
under existing rules, and under proposed changes to the current rules - so that the results 
could be compared to measure the expected impact of the policy change.' 
In spite of its wide spread use, outcomes from microsimulations are often criticized. 
Since in many cases, microsimulation models depend on strong behavioral assumptions, 
the estimates from those models may be biased by the researchers' priors on outcomes. In 
addition, experience has shown that microsimulation has limited validity when compared 
to actual outcomes. Researchers in project evaluation now accept that experimental 
methodology offers a better approach to conduct impact analysis. While microsimulation 
may provide an estimate of a projects' cost, the experimental approach focuses on the 
benefits of the project. Thus it is recommended that each method should be applied at 
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different stages in a project. 
Experimental Design 
The true impaa of a project cannot be assessed correctly unless we can establish a 
relevant counterfactual to the project. However, it is impossible to do this exactly since it 
would require observing the impact of the project's presence and absence simultaneously 
on a certain group. Instead, experimentalists must establish a control group of non-
participants for the project who have the same attributes as the group on whom the 
project is imposed. The participant group is called the treatment (or experimental) group, 
and the excluded group is called the control (or comparison) group. The project's net 
effect is measured as the gross outcome for an experimental group minus the gross 
outcome for a control group provided that all other factors which might affect behavioral 
outcomes are common across the treatment and control groups. 
It is critical to select comparable experimental and control groups in order to 
estimate a project's true impact. Statistically, the best way to create comparable 
experimental and control groups is through randomized assignment. Randomization does 
not necessarily mean a random sampling, but rather a random allocation to experimental 
and control groups from a target population. Ideally, randomized assignment will result in 
experimental and control groups which are identical except for the presence or absence of 
the treatment. This implies that baseline data on the experimental and control groups (i.e., 
data on the groups collected before the treatment was put in place) would have the same 
statistical moments. Any differences in the statistical moments between the groups after 
the intervention would be interpreted as the net effect of the intervention. However, in 
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practice, it may be impossible to obtain this degree of randomization. In small samplesg 
the groups may prove to be different, even if the assignment is randomized. For that 
reason, it may still be necessary to condition the comparison of outcomes on covariates 
which may differ between treatment and control groups. 
An example of randomized design applied to a social program is the evaluation of 
the Job Training and Partnership Act(JTPA) program. This evaluation illustrates both the 
advantages of and the possible hurdles encountered in the experimental approach. 
During the Reagan administration, JTPA was passed by Congress, replacing the 
previous Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). This legislation 
provided funding for services and job training opportunities for economically 
disadvantaged workers. Currently, the federal government provides JTPA services to 
about 900,000 persons each year at a cost about $3,000 per participant.^ 
The evaluation of job training programs including CETA and JTPA has been 
performed since the mid-1970s. Evaluators have depended on both non-experimental and 
experimental methods since these methods are believed to be appropriate to estimate the 
difference between the eanungs with and without the programs. Several authors have 
found that experimental design is superior to non-experimental design because non-
experimentally-based statistical analyses cannot avoid the selection bias problem. In the 
extreme case, some authors such as Bamow(l987) argue that"... experiments appear to be 
the only method available at this time to overcome the limitation of non-experimental 
evaluation" (p. 190). The study for JTPA also shows the practical difficulties in evaluating 
a program. The most difficult problem was the randomization of sites in which the study 
was to be conducted. Ideally sites should be selected randomly, but the JTPA study 
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selected virtually any site wtiich would agree to participate. Moreover, performance 
standards and resource allocations had to be modified from the original plan in order to 
gain cooperation of local programs. As a result, the sites included in the model were 
neither representative of JTPA sites generally, nor were they functioning under normal 
resources or conditions for a JTPA site. 
There have been very few evaluation studies in developing countries. Developing 
countries may be prone to rapid political change and turnover of governmental personnel 
which make it difficult to implement and monitor a project experiment. Also, there are 
relatively few professionals or consulting firms with the training necessary to carry out an 
impact evaluation compared to developed countries."* 
The lack of evaluation studies in developing countries may lead to implementation or 
expansion of ineffective programs. In countries with limited resources, opportunity costs 
associated with poorly designed or implemented programs in terms of foregone uses of 
resources are particularly large. The need to make efficient use of resources, together 
with budgetary constraints which makes it impossible to reach all potential beneficiaries 
at once, create both the need and the means for conduaing pilot interventions in 
developing countries. The advantages of using randomized experimentation for pilot 
program are that first, if it is designed at the program's first implementation phases, it can 
help policymakers choose among alternative program options. Second, it is less 
expensive than that for a fiilly implemented program. Third, in practice it is easier to 
randomize assignment to experimental and control groups when there is only partial 
coverage of potential beneficiaries than under a fully covered program. 
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Quasi-experimental Design 
Program evaluators often find that randomization is difficult or impossible. In that 
case, evaluators must use quasi-experimental (or non-randomized experimental) methods. 
The basic concept of this approach is exactly the same as the randomized experimental 
approach except that randomization is not available. Therefore, ±e key issue when using 
this method is how to construct a control group which mimics as closely as possible the 
characteristics of the experimental group. 
There are two types of quasi-experiments, classified by time points at which the 
design of evaluations begin and their implementation is undertaken. One is Ex-Ante 
Quasi-Experiments, in which control groups are constructed before the program 
intervention. This type of quasi-experiment is preferred since evaluators can get 
information about both control and treatment groups before intervention of a program so 
that comparability can be increased. In contrast, Ex-Post Quasi-Experiments, which is 
less preferred than Ex-Ante Quasi-Experiments, are those for which control groups are 
constructed after the program intervention. A common reason why this method is widely 
used in spite of increased problems of incomparability or selection bias is that the 
decision to carry out an evaluation is made after the program has already been 
implemented. 
The most widely used quasi-experimental method is the matched comparison 
approach, in which control groups are selected on the basis of characteristics which are 
comparable to those of the treatment group rather than random assignment. Therefore, in 
constructing matched control groups, it is desirable for evaluators to fiilly understand the 
factors that would affect the outcome. 
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While the matched comparison approach is still the most widely used quasi-
experiment, the flaws of this approach have been increasingly recognized. Evaluators can 
not with certainty avoid the selection bias problem in using this method. That is, even if 
observed attributes are identical, evaluators cannot ensure that participants and non-
participants also had identical unobserved attributes which might affect outcomes of the 
treatment. A study evaluating the Salk(polio) vaccine illustrates the possible flaws of the 
matched comparison method than when the experimental method was used. In that study, 
both experimental and matched comparison methods were used for evaluation. The 
vaccine was evaluated to be 14 percent more effective when the matched comparison 
method was used. Therefore, there were significant differences in measured outcomes 
using the two different evaluation methods. 
Reflexive Evaluation 
Another quasi-experimental method is reflexive evaluation. This method doesn't 
require a constructed control group. Instead, the participants serve as their own control 
group. The outcome of the program is measured as the change in observed behavior from 
before implementation to after the program is put in place. Researchers need panel data 
for this approach, or at least recall data on behavior before implementation. Even though 
this approach is less robust than experimental and matched comparison methods, most 
evaluation studies in developing countries use this approach simply because it is less 
expensive and easier to carry out.^ 
A possible flaw of this approach is that it is hard to disentangle programmatic effects 
from naturally occurring changes without the program. Evaluations using this approach 
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tend to be inaccurate when natural changes in the absence of a program are large. ^  
Several attempts have been made to increase the credibility of quasi-experimental 
design. One attempt was made by some statisticians and econometricians (Heckman and 
Robb, 1985) in the way to use econometric methods to adjust for the differences between 
constructed control groups and the experimental groups. This work was extended by 
James Heckman and V. Joseph Hotz(Heckman and Hotz, 1989). They focus on how 
evaluators can eliminate the selection bias problem which often arises when using non-
random control groups approach. They argue that"... simple specification tests eliminate 
the most unreliable and misleading estimators that give rise to the sensitivity problem 
recently discussed in the evaluation literature." (p.874) 
Nevertheless, the goal of any quasi-experimental evaluation is to mimic the outcome 
of a properly conducted evaluation using randomized design. That is why the randomized 
experimental approach is considered by many to be the best method to conduct an impact 
evaluation if it is feasible. 
13 
Notes 
V.Joseph Hotz. "Evaluatioii of Federal Social Programs: An Uncertain Impact". June 1993. pp. 38-39 
" Ibid. pp. 6-7 
^ See LaLonde (1995) for a detailed discussion. 
^ See John Newmaiu Laura Rawlings. and Paul Gertler (1994) 
' Joseph Valadez and Michael Bamberger. "Social Program Evaluation in Developing Coimtries". OcL 
1993. pp.26 
' Ibid. pp. 27 
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CAN PRIVATE SCHOOL SUBSIDIES INCREASE 
SCHOOLING FOR THE POOR?: THE QUETTA mBAN 
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM 
A paper submitted to the World Bank Working Paper Series on Impact Evaluation of 
Education Reforms 
Jooseop Kim\ Harold Alderman*, and Peter F. Orazem' 
Introduction 
Primary school enrollment rates in Pakistan are lower than in other countries at the 
same level of economic development. The proportion of children in school is about half 
that in India and three quarters that in Bangladesh and Nepal. Nationally, the enrollment 
rate is 58 percent, 69 percent for boys but only 42 percent for girls. The province of 
Balochistan has the lowest enrollments with only 45 percent of children aged 5-10 
enrolled in school. The enrollment gender gap is even wider in Balochistan with 62 
percent of boys but only 29 percent of girls enrolled.^ 
The government of Pakistan has established a goal of universal primary enrollment 
by the year 2006. This would require more than doubling girls' enrollment nationally and 
more than tripling girls' enrollment in Balochistan. However, increasing government 
school capacity is constrained by inadequate public budgets. The potential impact of 
these resources on increased enrollments has been limited by goverrunent school location 
decisions based more on political patronage than on local needs. 
The children least served by exiting public schools are girls, children in rural areas, 
and children in the poor neighborhoods of cities."* There is evidence that enrollment rates 
are constrained by insufficient school supply in urban areas.' However, there are 
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additional restrictions on adding new government schools in ±ese poor neighborhoods. 
The government requires ±at a neighborhood provide land for a new government school, 
but many of these neighborhoods have developed as squatters' communities with no 
established property rights on the land. Conversations with education officials confirmed 
that lack of defined property rights had greatly restricted the construction of new 
government schools in the poorest neighborhoods. 
The primary schooling opportunities for poor girls are much worse than for poor 
boys. There are relatively few girls' schools in poor neighborhoods, so that many girls 
have to enroll in boys' school if they want to get an education. Cultural prohibitions 
against exposing girls to the public have meant that the absence of girls' school meant a 
lack of educational opportunities for girls. If universal primary enrollment is to be 
achieved for girls, more separate girls' schools will need to be established. Given the 
limitations on increased government provision, an alternative is to try to increase the 
availability of private girls' schools in poor neighborhoods. 
This study measures the success of such an effort to induce the creation of new 
private girls' schools in Quetta, the capital city of Balochistan. This study is unique in that 
it represents one of the few attempts to use experimental design methods to evaluate an 
educational policy innovation.^ By randomizing the implementation of the pilot program, 
we are able to generate robust estimates of the impact of the program on enrollments. 
Random assignment avoids the bias in impact assessments inherent when the program is 
applied to individuals or groups believed to benefit atypically from the program. 
This study shows that regardless of how the impact is measured, the program 
increased girls' enrollments by an average of 33 percentage points. At the same time, boy 
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enrollments rose an average of 27.5 percentage points, partly because boys were also 
allowed to attend the new schools, and partly because parents would not send their girls 
to school and not also educate their boys. While neighborhoods differed in the success of 
the program, success was not clearly related to the relative wealth of a neighborhood or 
the education levels of the parents. As a consequence, it appears that the program offers 
tremendous promise for increasing enrollment rates in other poor urban areas. 
The Urban Girls' Fellowship Program 
In February 1995, the Balochistan Education Foundation launched the Urban Girls' 
Fellowship (UGF) Program in Quetta, the capital and largest city of Balochistan. The 
purpose of this pilot project was to determine whether establishing private schools in 
poor neighborhoods was a possible and cost effective means of expanding the delivery of 
primary educational services to girls in lower income neighborhoods of Quetta. Recent 
evidence from the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey suggests that about 77 percent 
of girls who stan school finish the primary cycle. It was thought that if these poor girls 
started school, it was probable that many would persist in school long enough to attain 
literacy. 
School establishment was to be encouraged through subsidies paid directly to 
schools. The subsidy was Rs. 100 (about $3) per month per girl. This subsidy was 
sufficient to cover typical tuition at the lowest priced private schools. The subsidy was 
scheduled to last three years, ending in February of 1998, after which the school would 
be on its own. The subsidy amount was reduced in the second year and reduced again in 
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the third year. Consequently, the schools needed to generate increased revenues from 
other sources over time if they were to meet their recurrent expenses. Schools were 
required to meet certain quality standards. These included a requirement that there be no 
more than 50 boys and girls per classroom, that there must be one teacher for every 
classroom, and that there could not be more boys than girls in the school. Boys were 
ineligible for scholarships, so schools had an incentive to attract as girls to an initial 
upper scholarship limit ofRs. 10,000 (100 girls x Rs. 100 per girl) per month. 
The pilot project was limited to ten initial sites. The only restrictions on choice of 
neighborhood were that the neighborhood had to be composed of poor households and 
that there be no existing government girls' school in the area. A non-governmental 
organization (NGO) was contracted to conduct an initial census of each site to establish 
the number of girls in the target age range (4-8) and to inform parents of the program.' 
The emphasis was to create a partnership between parents in a neighborhood and the 
school operator. This was to be accomplished by first conducting a meeting of parents in 
a neighborhood to see if they were interested in attracting a private school to their area. 
The parents were asked to form a committee, which would represent the neighborhood in 
negotiations with potential school operators. With the assistance of the NGO. the parents' 
committee developed a proposal regarding the neighborhood's requirements for a school, 
resources the neighborhood was willing to provide the school (i.e. land, buildings, 
equipment) and any other requirements an operator was expected to satisfy. Experienced 
school operators were provided these specifications and were allowed to make proposals 
in response. Each parent committee was allowed to select among the proposals. In the 
18 
end, proposals were received and accepted in all ten sites, and ten schools were ultimately 
opened.^ 
Survey Design and Data Strategies 
Because government resources are in limited supply and the need to expand 
enrollments is so great, the government of Balochistan needed an accurate measure of the 
program's success and its prognosis for expansion. It was decided to use randomized 
assignment into treatment and control groups to accomplish this task. However, there 
were several factors which constrained the experimental design.' With only ten possible 
sites, the government opted to place one school in each of ten urban slum areas of Quetta. 
This was considered politically expedient because it assured that all major ethnic groups 
would get at least one school. Ethnic groups tended to segregate into one or two of these 
slum areas, so the government could not be accused of favoritism. 
A second problem was that there was no recent census of the population from which 
one could define treatment and control populations. The most recent census was fourteen 
years old, and the population of Quetta was estimated to have grown at about seven 
percent per year since then. Consequently, an area frame sampling strategy was chosen to 
define the treatment and control neighborhoods. 
The area frame was designed as follows. A map of Quetta was produced with each of 
the ten slum areas outlined. In each area, three sites, literally points on a map, were 
selected. One of these areas was chosen randomly to be the treatment neighborhood for 
the creation of a private school. The other neighborhoods were reserved to be controls. 
The only criterion for the treatment neighborhood was that it could not already have a 
government girls' school. While it was possible that the control sites would contain a 
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government girls' school, it turned out that none of the control sites had girls' schools 
either. 
By randomizing site selection, it was hoped that there would be no systematic 
differences in characteristics and behavioral patterns between the control and the 
treatment neighborhoods. However, the lack of information on population characteristics 
and the small number of pilot sites led to the possibility that the two groups would differ 
in important ways. Therefore, it was important to collect information on population 
attributes in all sites to enable us to test for statistically important differences in treatment 
and control populations which might also affect differences in enrollment outcomes 
between the two groups. We also have an interest in determining if relative success of a 
school depends upon observable neighborhood characteristics. 
The baseline data collected in the treatment and control sites included information on 
socioeconomic characteristics of the households, parents' education, and educational 
attainment and current enrollment status of all children in the household. All households 
in the treatment neighborhoods were surveyed at the time of the promotion of the 
scholarship program in the summer of 1994 before any fellowship schools were opened. 
The baseline survey of households in the control group neighborhoods was conducted in 
July 1995. Because most of the data on socioeconomic status of the household does not 
change over time, the difference in the timing of the surveys should not be problematic. 
Information on the enrollment status of control neighborhood children was obtained for 
the current year (1995) and retrospectively for the previous year. This does raise the 
possibility of recall bias, although parents should be able to remember whether their 
children were in school a year earlier.Subsequently, enrollment data was collected in 
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1996 in both treatment and control neighborhoods. All data collection and training of 
surveyors was supervised by the Balochistan Education Management Information System 
(BEMIS) to insure data comparability. 
Theory of Enrollment Response to the Girls' Fellowship Program 
Before conducting the statistical comparison of the treatment and control 
neighborhoods, it is important to identify the possible endogenous responses to the 
program. It is also important to identify the exogenous variables that might condition the 
magnitude of those responses. Households are assumed to have parents, a daughter and a 
son. Parents are assumed to derive utility from their own consumption of goods (Zh) and 
from the human capital of their daughter (Hf) and their son (Hm). The utility fiinction has 
the form U=U(Zh, Hf, Hm, T), where T is a vector of taste indicators that are not subject to 
choice. Parents maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Sending their daughters to 
school requires that the household sacrifice current consumption and human capital 
investment for their sons. 
Let Y be household income, Pz be the price of consumption goods, and Pf and Pm are 
the prices of schooling for their daughter and son, respectively. The schooling price 
includes school fees, the cost of transportation, and the cost of materials. The income 
constraint on parental utility maximization is Pj Zh+ Pf Hf + PmHm = Y. 
For cultural reasons, parents may face some disutility from sending their daughters 
to school. Social prohibitions against exposing their daughters to the outside world will 
cause them to discount the utility they get from their daughter's education by some factor 
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df<l. Then the parents utility will have the form U(Zh, dfHf, T), with Unr = dfUnCZh, 
Hf, H„„T) and Unm = UhCZh, Hf, H„., T). 
The first order conditions yield the following relation; 
(2) U»r=d^»(Zh.Hf.H^. T^ = Pf 
UHm UhCZh, Hf, Hm, T) Pm 
where Uht and Unm represent the marginal utility of girls schooling and boys 
schooling, respectively. To get parents to equalize schooling for their boys and girls so 
that Hf= Hm = H, the cost of girls schooling must be discounted by Pf = dfPm < Pm-
Altematively, if the pecuniary costs of schooling are the same for boys and girls so that Pf 
= Pm, then the right-hand-side of (2) will equal one. Then, dfUnCHf) = UH(Hm), which 
implies that UnCHf) > LrH(Hm). Diminishing marginal utility would then imply that Hm > 
Hf at the optimum. 
Reduced form equations for boy's and girl's schooling have the following functional 
forms: 
(3) Hf=Hf(Pf,Pm,df, Y,P„T) 
W Hm = H^(Pm.Pf.df, Y, P3.T) 
The reduced form equations suggest that enrollment will depend on school fees, the 
rate at which parents discount girls' education relative to boys, income, the price level, 
and tastes. Numerous studies suggest that education is a normal good so that cHm/cY > 0 
and cH(/cY > 0. Those conditions are sufficient to insure that cHm/cPm < 0 and cHf/cPf 
<0. The discount factor df acts as an additional price on girls' schooling, so ^(/cdf < 0. 
The girls' fellowship program will lower Pf, so girls' schooling will increase. The impact 
of the fellowship program on boys' enrollment is ambiguous. However, there are two 
reasons to believe that the girls' fellowship program will have a positive impact on boys' 
schooling. First, the program creates a new low priced private school that can accept 
boys, lowering Pm, although it lowers Pf even more. Second, boys' education may 
increase as their sisters go to school for a very practical reason - parents may want their 
boys to escort their sisters to and from school. This implies that boys' education and girls' 
education may be complementary goods so that cHm/cPf < 0. In any event, it will be 
important to monitor both boys' and girls' enrollments in response to the program. 
Equations 3) and 4) suggest that income, the cost of schooling, and the disamenity of 
sending girls to school may condition the enrollment response to the fellowship program. 
Schooling costs are measured by fees charged in existing neighborhood schools, average 
distance to schools (a proxy for transport costs) and the opportunity cost of child time 
(measured by the child's age and its square). The parents' disamenity for sending girls to 
school is assumed to be inversely related to fathers' and mothers' education. Parents' taste 
for education are also assumed to depend on the child's birth order (there may be a 
preference for educating the eldest child, particularly the eldest boy) and on citizenship 
(refugees may value education less or may feel the return from education is less). These 
variables comprise the vector of exogenous variables we will use in the analysis below. 
Differences and Similarities Between Treatment and Control 
Neighborhoods 
Statistical properties of the baseline data are described in Table I for both treatment 
and control neighborhoods. Sample statistics are reported separately for boys and girls. 
The treatment sample included 1,310 children, 781 girls and 529 boys. The control 
sample included 1,358 children, 697 girls and 661 boys. Enrollment rates for boys and 
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girls in the treatment group were higher than those in the control group: 6.6% higher for 
girls and 8.8% higher for boys. The other variables in Table I represent the exogenous 
variables believed to affect parental enrollment choices for their children. Most of the 
variables come directly from the questionnaire. However, distance to school, annual fees, 
and household income were generated from information on the survey. Distance to 
school and annual fees were measured as the neighborhood average distance and annual 
fees of the children in school. Averages are the appropriate measure since people all live 
in the same neighborhood. Household income was estimated using information on the 
number of adults in the household with various educational attainments and various 
household assets. Details on the estimated measure of household income are contained in 
the Appendix. 
The purpose of the control group is to get information on the counterfactual state.'' 
A reasonable approximation of the change in outcome due to the program intervention is 
to measure the difference in outcomes between the treatment and control groups before 
and after the intervention. However, it is important to check whether there are important 
differences between the treatment and the control groups which might also result in 
different outcomes.'^ 
Tests for statistical significance of the differences between the treatment and the 
control groups were performed in two ways. First, in order to check if the randomization 
yielded observationally equivalent treatment and control populations, we conducted tests 
of the equality of means of the endogenous and exogenous variables. A second analysis 
was based on estimated enrollment equations in the baseline data. These tested the null 
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hypothesis of the equality of behavioral coefficients in the enrollment choice models for 
the treatment and control neighborhoods. 
Tests of Equality of Means in the Baseline Data Sets 
The third and sixth columns of Table 1 report the corrected t-values and the degrees 
of freedom for tests of the hypotheses that the means of variables are equal across the 
treatment and control groups/^ The results show that baseline enrollment rates for both 
sexes were significantly higher in the treatment group. In addition, there were significant 
differences in average mother's education and birth order between the treatment and 
control girls. Nevertheless, the differences were small numerically. For boys, father's 
highest grade and citizenship were significantly higher in the treatment group. Once 
again, the differences in means were small numerically. The joint test that the means 
were equal across all variables was easily rejected. Based upon the results, we can reach a 
statistical conclusion that the treatment and control samples are not identical. 
Tests of Equality Coefficients in the Baseline Enrollment Model 
A second way that the treatment and control neighborhoods may differ is in the 
decision-making process of parents. To check this, we estimated the following binary 
model of parental decision regarding their children's schooling: 
(5) R,,* = (3t'Xu + Uu 
where Rit = 1 if R,t* > 0 
R,t = 0 ifRi,* <0 
In equation (5), an unobserved variable Ru* depends on the index function, 3t'Xit, 
where Xn is the vector of characteristics in equations (3) and (4) which affect parental 
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choices regarding their children's enrollment. When R,t* is positive, we observe the child 
in school and Rit=l. Otherwise, the child will not enroll. 
Table 2A presents the baseline probit estimates of enrollment choice for boys and 
girls. Separate estimates are presented for the treatment and control neighborhoods. The 
estimated parameters exhibit the same sign patterns in the treatment and control groups 
and are qualitatively similar to results obtained in other studies of enrollment. The 
coefficient on household income is positive in both samples. Parental education 
positively influences their children's enrollment, and mother's education is a more 
important factor influencing girl's education than father's education. Enrollment increases 
with age, but at a diminishing rate. First-bom children have a higher probability of 
enrollment than their younger siblings, but the coefficient is not significant. Native 
Pakistanis have a higher probability of enrollment. After pooling the treatment and the 
control data, we can also estimate the effects of neighborhood average distance to school 
and average annual fees. They have negative coefficients except for a positive but 
insignificant effect of annual fees on boy's schooling. 
Table 2B shows the result of the tests of equality of coefficients between the 
treatment and the control groups. The coefficients for the two groups are not statistically 
different, except for father's educational level in the girls enrollment equation. This result 
suggests that parental decision making on education is similar in the treatment and 
control neighborhoods. Despite significant differences in characteristics as reported in 
table I, we can still measure the change in enrollment due to the program by measuring 
the difference between treatment and control group enrollment rates, holding constant the 
differences in the exogenous variables. 
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Evaluation Strategy 
The evaluation problem is essentially a missing data problem. A child i cannot be 
simultaneously in both the treatment state (Riu) and the control state (Roit). Letting d; = 1 
if child i was eligible for the fellowship, and dj = 0 otherwise, the observed outcome(Rit) 
can be expressed as Rjt = di Rin + (l-di)Roit- Given the impossibility of observing the true 
impact of the fellowship program (at = Rut - Roit), the goal is to get an unbiased estimator 
ofott. 
One way to get an unbiased estimator of ai is to use a control group to derive 
estimates of the counterfactual state. The difference in outcomes between the treatment 
and control groups is used as an estimate of at. Different estimators of at depend on 
different assumptions about the control group. Three estimators depend only on 
comparisons of endogenous outcomes without controlling for the exogenous variables. 
Mathematically, these are defined as 
(6) Reflexive: E'^(ai,idi=l) = E(RTt) - E(RiBidi=I) 
(7) Quasi-experimental; E^(ait|di=l) = [EfRxt) - ECRm,)] - [E(R,Bidi=l)  - E(R,B!di=0)] 
(8) Experimental; E^(ait|di=l) = [E(RTt) - ECRnO] 
where subscripts T, B, and N represent treatment neighborhoods, baseline data, and 
control neighborhoods, respectively. In equation (6), the expected program effect, 
E(a,t|di=l), is measured by the gap between the expected enrollment rate after the 
program, E(RTt), and the expected enrollment rate before the program was implemented, 
E(R,B|di=l). This only requires information on enrollments for the treatment group. The 
method based on the equation (6) is called the reflexive method. The underlying 
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assumption of this method is that the period t outcome without the program would have 
been identical to the observed pre-program outcome. 
In equation (7), the expected program effect is measured by the gap between the post 
program outcome in the treatment group, ECRxt), and that in the control group, ECRxt), 
adjusted by the initial difference between the two groups, E(RiB|di=l) - E(RiBidi=0). This 
method is called the quasi-experimental, nonequivalent control method. In this method, it 
is assumed that the difference in outcomes between the two groups before the program 
intervention would be constant over time if it were not for the program, so the difference 
in outcome between the two groups after the program intervention reflects the difference 
due to the program as well as to the initial difference. Differencing the differences yields 
an estimate of the program effect. 
In equation (8), the expected program effect is measured by the observed gap in 
outcomes between the treatment group and the control group after the program 
intervention. This is called the experimental method, in which it is assumed that the 
control group mimics perfectly the treatment group. 
The methodological differences follow from different assumptions about the 
unobserved counterfactual state, which is the state when the program was not established. 
The methods based on equations (6) through (8) assume the counterfactual state is non-
stochastic, If we relax that assumption so that the counterfactual state, Roit, follows a 
stochastic process, it is possible to set up the following model; 
(9) Roit= X,t pt + Uit 
In equation (9), Xu is the vector of observed characteristics as in equations (3) and (4), 
Uit is an error term, and Pt is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Modifying equation 
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(9) using the definition of the program effect, au, and assuming that the program effect is 
invariant across individuals but not time so that ait=at, we have 
(10) Covariate post-test; Rit = Xu 3t + diat + Uit, for t = 0,1, ,T 
In equation (10), Rit is the observed enrollment rate, and di is a dummy variable 
indicating residence in a fellowship school neighborhood. Assuming Xit is independent of 
the unobserved variables Uit, so that E(Ujt|Xjt)=0 for all i,t, we can estimate equation (10) 
using a cross-sectional data set. An alternative way to estimate the program effect using 
econometric analysis is to use a first-difference model. Assuming intervention occurs 
between time t and t-1, and since all the variables except the age variable are time 
invariant, we can modify equation (10) to be 
(11) First difference with covariates: Rii - Rin = X, (3t - Pt-i) + dittt -f Un- Uu-i. 
A fiirther assumption that (3tis also time invariant simplifies equation (9) to 
(12) First difference without covariates; R,t - Rit-i = dittt + U,t-
Results 
There are two ways of measuring the effect of the program on enrollments. One is to 
measure the change in enrollment for children in the target age of 5 to 8. The other is to 
measure enrollment rates longitudinally for children aged 5 to 8 in the initial year of the 
fellowship program. 
Results of Age-specific Analysis 
Because the program was aimed to improve access to school for a target age group, 
this section estimates the effect on enrollments of 5-8 year old children of access to the 
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fellowship program. 
The first four columns of table 3 report age-specific enrollment rates for boys and 
girls before and after the program intervention. The enrollment rate decreased 7 .6 % for 
boys and rose 1.3 % for girls in the control neighborhoods. At the same time, enrollment 
in the fellowship school neighborhoods rose 19.8 % for boys and 26.0 % for girls. From 
this information, we can apply three different methods based on equations (6) through 
(8). The results using those methods are reported in the first three rows of table 8. The 
results are similar across all three methods. All imply that the fellowship program had a 
positive effect on girls in the target age group, and that parents sent their boys to school 
in increasing numbers as well. Applying the same methods to two years of data yield 
even larger estimates of the enrollment effects of the fellowship schools. 
An alternative method based on equation (10) can also be applied to the same 
sample. The first two and the last two columns of table 4 report the results of the 
covariate post-test probit analysis of the probability of enrollment using cross-sectional 
data. The enrollment rate in fellowship neighborhoods rose 33.4 % for girls, and 22.4 % 
for boys in the first year of the fellowship program. After two years, enrollment in the 
fellowship neighborhoods had risen 42.7 % for girls and 38.4 % for boys. These results 
are consistent with the resuhs in table 3. First, this result shows that parents made 
responses very quickly to the fellowship program. Considering the fellowship schools 
were established in February in 1995, and that survey data were collected in July of that 
year, the response of the parents in the target area was nearly instantaneous. This supports 
the view that there was excess demand for primary education in these poor areas. Second, 
the resuh suggests that the fellowship program was continuously successfiil year by year. 
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For girls, the estimated program effect increased by almost 10 % in 1996 over the 
estimated program effect in 1995. Boys' enrollment rates grew 16 % in the year after 
implementation. 
Results of Cohort-specific Analysis 
The cohort-specific analysis follows the enrollments of a fixed group of children 
over time. This sample has two distinct advantages over the age-specific analysis. First, it 
allows us to see if initial gains in enrollment persist over time. Because it is assumed that 
five years of schooling are needed to attain permanent literacy, this program will be truly 
successful only if children remain in school for several years. The other advantage of the 
cohort-specific analysis is that we can control for individual specific unobservable effects 
which might also be correlated with program outcomes. 
The last four columns of table 3 report the enrollment rates before and after the 
program intervention for fixed cohorts of boys and girls in the treatment and the control 
groups. We begin with the cohort aged 4-7 in 1994 to capture the children aged five to 
eight in 1995.'^ Because enrollments increase with age at least initially, some of the 
enrollment growth in the cohort-specific analysis will reflect a maturity effect. 
Nevertheless, the comparison between the fellowship and control neighborhoods should 
difference away this maturity effect, leaving an unbiased estimate of the program effect. 
Estimates of the fellowship effect for the cohort-specific sample are summarized in 
the last three rows in table 3. The reflexive method will yield upward biased estimates 
because of the maturity effect, as evidenced by the 46.8 % increase in boys' enrollment, 
and 44.3 % increase in girls' enrollment. These estimated effects are much bigger than the 
reflexive estimates in the age-specific analysis. 
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The estimates from the quasi-experimental, nonequivalent control method and the 
experimental method remove the maturity effect under the assumption of common 
maturity effects across neighborhoods. Consequently, the measured program effects 
using quasi-experimental and experimental methods are smaller than the reflexive 
estimate, and are more comparable to the estimates using the age-specific sample. All the 
results show large gains in both boy and girl enrollments folloAving the opening of the 
fellowship schools. Most estimates show slightly higher enrollment gains for girls than 
for boys. Looking across the age-specific and cohort-specific estimates, we can conclude 
that girl em-ollments rose by 25-35 percent as a result of the program, and that boy 
enrollments rose by a few percentage points less. 
The first four columns of table 4 report the cohort-specific post-test probit analysis of 
the probability of enrollment. The inclusion of quadratic terms in age control for 
maturation, so the coefficients on the treatment dummy can be interpreted as an estimate 
of the program effect controlling for the maturity effect. The program effects for the 
children aged five to eight in 1995 were measured as 33.4 % and 22.4 % increase in 
enrollment for girls and boys, respeaively. One year later, the measured effects grew an 
additional 6.5 % for girls, and 4.4 % for boys. Rising effects over time indicate that the 
large initial enrollment gains persisted over time. The persistence of the effect is a 
promising sign for the continued survival of these schools, particularly since fees rose in 
the second year in many schools. 
Results of First-DifTerence Analysis 
Another possible source of bias in the estimate of the program effect is unobserved 
heterogeneity in children that is correlated with the program effect. If cross-sectional 
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differences in individual fixed effects are responsible for measured program effects, then 
we can remove the fixed effect by differencing the dependent variable. 
Table 5 presents the results of the first difference analysis under the maintained 
assumption ±at the coefficients of the regressors are time invariant. The dependent 
variable is the change in enrollment status from before to after the implementation of the 
program. The coefficient on the treatment dummy measures the effect of the program on 
enrollment choice. The last two specifications of the first difference analysis allow the 
coefficients on the individual and neighborhood effects to vary over time. The results 
corroborate results presented above in the sense that the coefficient representing the 
treatment effect, is significantly positive, and the program effect was larger for girls' 
enrollment than boys' enrollment. However, now the estimated program effect is larger 
after one year than after two years, in contrast to the cross-sectional results. The cause of 
the discrepancy is unclear, but must be related to the control for fixed effects. Note that 
the enrollment rates were initially higher in the fellowship neighborhoods, and children in 
school before the fellowship schools opened will not contribute to the measured 
fellowship school effect in the first difference analysis. Note also that it is possible that 
the opening of the fellowship schools encouraged parents to send their children to school 
at younger ages, and the smaller effect over time reflects the first-time enrollment of 
older children in the control neighborhoods. In fact, some of the later enrollment growth 
in control neighborhoods may be related to the fellowship program if the promotion of 
children's education in fellowship neighborhoods spilled over to the control 
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the estimated two years enrollment growth effects in 
specification four are large. Controlling for fixed effects lowers the estimated effect by 12 
to 30 percent, leaving the estimated enrollment impact of the fellowship school to be 24.2 
percent for boys and 28.1 percent for girls. 
Results of Neighborhood-Specific Analysis 
Given the strong average estimated enrollment growth due to the creation of the 
fellowship schools, an important issue is whether there is any significant variation in 
program effects across the neighborhoods. If so, are there any identifiable neighborhood 
attributes which increase the likelihood of program success? This analysis is necessarily 
speculative since there are only 10 neighborhoods and therefore 10 degrees of freedom. 
Neighborhoods were divided into two groups, neighborhoods with over 30 % increase in 
girls' enrollment, and those below 30 %. 
Table 6 reports the summary statistics for these more and less successful 
neighborhoods. Eight neighborhoods out of ten neighborhoods fell into the more 
successful group, so the less successful neighborhoods were the clear exception. Several 
important findings are apparent. For most variables, the sample means are similar in the 
two groups. One apparent difference is in household income. However, the higher 
average income is in the less successful neighborhoods. Clearly if the concern was that 
poor neighborhoods could not benefit from a subsidized private school, that fear was 
exaggerated. 
Average parental education in neighborhoods is also not a prerequisite for success. 
Differences in parental education were insignificant. Taking the averages at face value, 
the program was more successful in the neighborhoods with more educated mothers but 
less educated fathers. 
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The variables which differed significantly between the more and less successful 
neighborhoods were citizenship and distance, although the numerical differences were 
not great. Citizenship was positively related to enrollment of both boys and girls in the 
baseline estimates. It is reasonable to assume that the greater success in neighborhoods 
with higher proportions of citizens reflects a stronger taste for schooling. 
Shorter distance to school reflects higher density of schools in a neighborhood. It is 
not clear why fellowship schools in neighborhoods with more competing schools should 
do better. On the other hand, the difference in commuting time between more and less 
successful neighborhoods was only two minutes, so the difference is probably unrelated 
school success. 
An intriguing result was that boys' enrollments rose in neighborhoods with more 
success raising girls' enrollments, but that boys' enrollments fell in the neighborhoods that 
were relatively less successful. Why this happened is unclear. However, the result is 
consistent with a presumption that boys' enrollment and girls' enrollment are 
complementary so that successfully increasing enrollment of one gender will also 
increase enrollments overall. 
Comparison with Alteraative Policy Options 
Given the apparent success of the fellowship program, is it cost effective when 
compared to alternative policy options? Table 7 reports the estimated changes in 
alternative policies needed to match enrollment increase that resulted from the fellowship 
program. Two policy options were considered: income transfers to poor households and 
construction of new schools. Our estimates are based on estimated enrollment choice 
elasticities with respect to income and distance. 
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Girls' schooling is much more sensitive to household income than is boys' 
enrollment. Based on our estimates, 3471 Rs. of direct subsidy to a household would be 
needed to raise the probability of girls' enrollment by 25 %. This is well above the initial 
subsidy of 1400 Rs. per year per girl in the fellowship program. A similar increase in 
boys' enrollment probability would require an income transfer of 15030 Rs.. For 
comparison. Alderman, Orazem, and Patemo (1996) reported that a 10% increase of 
household income causes a 1.2 % increase in ±e enrollment rate in private school, 
implying that an income transfer of 14808 Rs would be required to raise enrollment 25 % 
for both sexes. Therefore, the fellowship option would be less expensive than income 
subsidies. 
A policy which decrease distance to schools implies establishing more schools. Our 
estimates imply that 78% more schools would be required to raise enrollment by 25 %. 
However, the coefficient on distance was not precisely estimated, at least in part because 
there was little variation in distance to schools across neighborhoods. However, 
Alderman, Orazem. Patemo (1996) estimated the enrollment elasticity with respect to 
distance was 0.1. Based upon this estimation, 250% more private schools would be 
required to meet the target effect. 
Conclusions and Extensions 
A summary of all measured program effects is contained in table 8. All of the results 
show that the fellowship program has positively affected enrollment for both boys and 
girls. Most show that the effect was larger for girls' enrollment. One can conclude that the 
estimated program effects are robust to differences in assumptions about possible biases 
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due to measured and umneasured differences between treatment and control 
neighborhoods. Before the project was implemented, it was not clear whether low girls' 
enrollment was due to cultural barriers which cause parents to withhold their daughters 
from school or to inadequate supply of girls' schools. The results of the urban fellowship 
experiment provide strong evidence that subsidizing the establishment of girls' primary 
schools can lead to sharp increases of girls' enrollment. In addition, even though the 
fellowship was given only to girls, boys' enrollment in those neighborhoods also sharply 
increased. This suggests that there also may have been excess demand for boys' primary 
education in these poor areas. The measured change over two years yielded mixed 
evidence on whether the enrollment growth advantage in fellowship neighborhoods over 
control neighborhoods continued to grow over time. However, even if the initial 
enrollment gain decreased in subsequent years, the enrollment gains after two years are 
still around 25 percentage points. School success appears not to depend on neighborhood 
income or other observable socioeconomic variables, suggesting that expansion of the 
program to other poor neighborhoods is also likely to be successftil. 
Future work will be required to assess the long term effects of the fellowship 
program. In particular, the future sustainability of the schools and the enrollment effects 
after the subsidies expire will need to be assessed. The short term success of the 
fellowship program does not guarantee long term success when the financial burden of 
supporting the schools are fully borne by the neighborhoods. School outcomes will also 
need to be assessed. The ultimate success of the fellowship program depends on whether 
children attain literacy. 
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Table I. Summary Statistics of Baseline Datasets and Tests of the Equality of Means 
Between the Treatment and Control Groups^^'"^ 
Variable 
Treatment 
Girls 
Control t-value Treatment 
Bovs 
Control t-value^^ 
Enrollment rate 0.366 0.300 2.67 0.486 0.398 3.03 
(0.482) (0.459) [1.468] (0.500) (0.490) [1180] 
Household Income 7.108 6.808 1.03 7,005 6,592 1.41 
(7.157) (3.011) [1.4761 (6.815) (2,847) [1188] 
Age 6.026 6.001 0.19 6.040 6.003 0.44 
(1.403) (1.429) [1.4761 (1.426) (1.444) [1188] 
Mother's highest grade 0.619 0.395 2.08 0.623 0.414 1.74 
(2.243) (1.844) [1,466] (2.208) (1.918) [1183] 
Father's highest grade 3.405 3.079 1.27 3.635 2.723 3.38 
(4.745) (4.882) [1.417] (4.579) (4.548) [1162] 
Birth order 2.832 3.004 2.21 3.074 2.965 1.27 
(1.474) (1.510) [1.476] (1.447) (1.482) [1188] 
Citizenship 0.868 0.835 1.79 0.877 0.814 2.98 
(0.339) (0.371) [1.476] (0.329) (0.389) [1188] 
Distance to school 17.77 17.81 0.05 16.93 16.42 0.62 
(9.443) (9.991) [491] (9.338) (9.394) [515] 
Annual fees 244.3 187.0 1.19 531.3 391.7 1.73 
(536.0) (502.5) [480] (1036.8) (765.1) [505] 
Joint test^' 121.61 82.20 
Ntmiber of observations 781 697 529 661 
1) Age 4 to 8 for both groups. The baseline data was collected m 1994 for the treatment group, and collected m 1995 
for the control group. 
2) The numbers shown m parentheses are the standard deviations and those in the square brackets are the degrees of 
freedom. The degrees of freedom differ due to missing information in the surveys. 
3) The null hypothesis is that the mean of the variable in the treatment group is equal to that in the control group. If the 
t-value IS smaller than 1.96. the null hv-pothesis cannot be rejected at 0.05 significance level. 
4) Reported numbers are F statistics with degrees of freedom (9, 1478) for girls and (9,1190) for boys. The null 
hypothesis was that the means of the vanables between the treatment group and the control group are equal for all 
variables. 
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Table 2A. Baseline Probit Analysis of the Probability of Enrollment 
Variable Girls and Bovs Girls Boys 
Treatments Controls Pooled Treatments Controls Pooled Treatments Controls Pooled 
Household 0.138 0.422 0.143 0.171 0.572 0.196 0.037 0.218 0.043 
Income/10.000 (2.362) (2.879) (2.710) (2.377) (2.870) (2.921) (0.346) (0.954) (0.455) 
Age 1.820 2.235 2.060 1.611 2.623 2.045 2.176 1.927 2.065 
(5.226) (6.323) (8.396) (3.612) (4.864) (6.048) (3.674) (3.986) (5.650) 
Age square -0.101 -0.140 -0.124 -0.089 -0.174 -0.127 -0.119 -0.119 -0.118 
(3.621) (5.014) (6.347) (2.508) (4.127) (4.745) (2.513) (2.884) (4.044) 
Mother's 0.051 0.094 0.065 0.067 0.118 0.082 0.007 0.072 0.036 
Highest grade (2.443) (3.422) (4.091) (2.500) (2.649) (3.739) (0.197) (1.963) (1.516) 
Father's 0.023 0.065 0.049 0.027 0.084 0.057 0.025 0.050 0.040 
Highest grade (2.369) (6.634) (7.337) (2.271) (5.997) (6.570) (1.498) (3.550) (3.794) 
Birth order -0.029 -0.036 -0.030 -0.017 -0.020 -0.021 -0.036 -0.053 -0.036 
(0.918) (1.214) (1.407) (0.416) (0.461) (0.732) (0.717) (1.251) (1.153) 
Citizenship 0.693 0.335 0.569 0.628 0.214 0.482 0.762 0.538 0.716 
(5.207) (2.556) (6.375) (3.590) (1.079) (3.839) (3.545) (2.888) (5.464) 
Girl -0.419 
(4.878) 
-0.541 
(5.340) 
-0.474 
(7.106) 
Distance -0.001 -0.012 
To School (0.036) (0.598) 
Annual -0.380 0.073 
Fees/1.000 (1.185) (0.271) 
Number of 1.231 1.324 2.555 725 677 1.402 506 647 1.153 
Observations 
Pseudo R" 0.277 0.295 0.273 0.230 0.331 0.254 0.358 0.293 0.304 
Table 2B. Equality Test on Coefficient Between Treatment and Control Group 
Variable Girls and Bovs Girls Bovs 
result 
•/-" result 7." result 
income 2.03 not reject 2.58 not rejea 0.25 not reject 
age 0.09 not reject 0.02 not rejea 0.14 not reject 
age square 0.89 not rejea 0.47 not rejea 0.99 not reject 
mother's highest grade 1.50 not reject 0.73 not rejea 1.95 not reject 
father's highest grade 7.68 rejea 6.88 rejea 1.09 not rejea 
birth order 0.07 not reject 0.00 not rejea 0.04 not reject 
citizenship 1.20 not rejea 1.36 not rejea 0.00 not rejea 
girl 0.05 not rejea 
Joint Test 29.90 rejea 23.33 reject 13.68 reject 
Significance level: a = 0.05 
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Table 3. Enrollment Rate Before and After Program Intervention 
Age-specific Cohort-snecific 
Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Bovs Girls Bovs Girls 
Enrollment Rate 56.33 45.29 51.06 34.86 38.75 34.06 36.55 29.03 
Before ProgramCEs) 
Enrollment Rate 64.29 63.93 49.68 38.37 64.29 63.93 49.68 38.37 
in 1995(E95) 
Enrollment Rate 76.15 71.30 43.50 36.20 85.50 78.36 59.87 45.97 
in I996(E96) 
E95 -Eb 7.96 18.64 -1.38 3.51 25.54 29.87 13.13 9.34 
E96-EB 19.82 26.01 -7.56 L.34 46.75 44.30 23.32 16.94 
Measure of Effect Ase-SDeciHc Cohort-snecific 
Bovs Girls Bovs Girls 
Reflexive. 1994-1995 8.0 18.6 25.5 29.9 
Reflexive, 1994-1996 19.8 26.0 46.8 44.3 
Quasi-experimentaL 1994-1995 9.3 15.1 12.4 20.5 
Quasi-experimentaL 1994-1996 27.4 24.8 23.4 27.4 
Experimental. 1994-1995 14.6 25.6 14.6 25.6 
Experimental. 1994-1996 32.7 35.1 25.6 32.4 
Note: Since 1994 baseline data for the control group was not available, the\' were estimated from the 1995 baseline data 
in the way that children who enrolled in advances grades in 1995 and enrolled in recall data were considered in enrolled 
m 1994. 
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Table 4. Post-test Probit Analysis of Probability of Enrollment Using Cross-sectional 
Data'^ 
Variable 1995-' 1996, Cohort-specific^' 1996, Age-specific^^ 
Girls Bovs Girls Bovs Girls Bovs 
Treatment dummy 0.334 0.224 0.399 0.268 0.427 0.384 
(10.148) (5.143) (9.679) (5.511) (8.488) (5.495) 
Household Income/10,000 -0.001 -0.003 0.012 0.072 0.034 0.128 
(0.022) (0.080) (0.333) (1.513) (0.724) (1.872) 
Age 0.141 0.276 0.229 0.936 0.615 1.330 
(0.652) (1.197) (0.797) (3.416) (1.970) (3.925) 
.A.ge square -0.008 -0.016 -0.011 -0.057 -0.036 -0.083 
(0.496) (0.890) (0.570) (3.113) (1.546) (3.268) 
Mother's highest grade 0.016 0.030 0.029 0.011 0.027 0.018 
(0.040) (2.330) (1.505) (0.867) (1.822) (1.231) 
Father's highest grade 0.013 0.003 0.030 0.011 0.035 0.020 
(3.383) (0.707) (6.293) (2.433) (6.656) (3.523) 
Birth order -0.008 -0.026 -0.016 -0.020 -0.0002 -0.031 
(0.720) (2.042) (1.214) (1.516) (0.016) (1.904) 
Citizenship 0.152 0.225 0.143 0.20 L 0.L87 0.173 
(3.040) (4.362) (2.374) (3.501) (2.783) (2.465) 
Distance to School -0.008 0.003 -0.029 -0.027 -0.035 -0.036 
(1.074) (0.358) (3.190) (2.347) (3.361) (2.511) 
Aimual Fees/1.000 -0.443 -0.030 -0.170 -0.362 -0.316 -0.618 
(3.640) (0.241) (1.088) (2.535) (1.719) (2.723) 
Number of observations 1.031 830 845 700 764 650 
Pseudo R' 0.141 0.100 0.312 0.215 0.350 0.380 
1) The coefficients reported here are dF/dX, where F is dependent variable and X is independent variable, not actual 
coefficients. Since the dependent variable is a discrete variable. dF/dX is not identical to actual coefficients. The 
numbers shown in the parentheses are z-values corrected for cluster effect. Dummy variables for each neighborhood 
included. 
2) Children in this data are aged 5 to 8 in 1995. Dependent variable is enrollment status in 1995. 
3) Children in this data are aged 5 to 8 in 1995. Dependent variable is enrollment status in 1996. 
4) Children m this data are aged 5 to 8 in 1996. Dependent variable is enrollment status in 1996. 
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Table 5. First DifFerace Analysis for Change of Enrollment Decision'^ 
Variable 1994-• 1995 1994-• 1996 1994-• 1995 1994-• 1996 
Giris Bovs Girls Boys Girls Bovs Girls Bovs 
Treatment Dummy 0.367 0.292 0.264 0.088 0.469 0.428 0.281 0.242 
(5.518) (3.591) (3.165) (0.909) (5.833) (3.755) (2.931) (1.723) 
A age square -0.077 -0.082 -0.047 -0.046 -0.071 0.032 0.079 0.073 
(4.785) (4.447) (5.006) (4.502) (0.343) (0.137) (0.641) (1.323) 
Age94 square -0.001 -0.022 -0.047 -0.080 
(0.040) (0.525) (1.055) (1.686) 
Income/10.000 -0.151 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 
(2.680) (0.122) (1.309) (0.588) 
Mother's highest grade -0.007 0.016 -0.009 -0.030 
(0.374) (0.652) (0.380) (1.020) 
Father's highest grade 0.004 -0.028 0.043 0.014 
(0.458) (2.751) (4.561) (1.226) 
Birth order -0.029 -0.050 -0.008 -0.021 
(1.152) (1.667) (0.250) (0.616) 
Citizenship 0.006 0.093 0.243 0.212 
(0.047) (0.717) (1.515) (1.318) 
Distance to school -0.001 0.027 -0.054 0.029 
(0.051) (1.407) (1.936) (1.272) 
Aimual fees/1.000 -0.755 -0.103 -0.588 0.765 
(2.424) (0.299) (1.623) (1.813) 
Number of observ ations 1.055 861 863 725 
Pseudo R" 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05 
I) The Coefficients reported here are dF/dX. not actual coefficients. Children in the sample are aged 4 to 7 m 1994. 
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Table 6. Statistical Summary of Successful and Unsuccessful Neighborhoods 
Variable Girls 
more successfiil less successfiil t-value 
income 6,819 8,060 2.05 
(6690) (8468) 
mother's highest grade 0.68 0.42 1.37 
(2.36) (1.81) 
father's highest grade 3.28 3.82 1.34 
(4.76) (4.70) 
citizenship 0.90 0.76 4.94 
(0.30) (0.43) 
distance to school 17.44 19.06 9.55 
(2.05) (1.84) 
annual fees 247.0 251.6 0.42 
(128.1) (134.9) 
number of observations 599 182 
girl's eiffollment change 41.5% 8.5 % 
boys' eru-ollment change 36.8 % - 1.8 % 
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Table 7 Estimated needs to meet target effect 
Alternatives elasticities change required to meet target efFea (25%) 
girls bovs girls boys 
Direct subsidv to household 0.503 0.115 3471 Rs./household 15030Rs./household 
(50%) (150%) 
Decrease distance to school 0.320 0.732 13.48 min. 5.71 min 
(78 %) (34 %) 
Note; Children in the sample were aged 4 to 7. Numbers in parenthesis reports the amount as percentage 
needed to meet target effect For example, direct subsidy' to household which leads 50 % increase in 
household income may increase 25 % increase in girls' enrollment rate. 
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Table 8 Comparison of the Effect of the Fellowship Program 
Methods 
Mathematical Expression 
Age-spedfic 
Bovs Girls 
Cohort-stiecific 
Bovs Girls 
Measure of effea 
using means 
EV„|d.=l)= E{RTt)-E(Ra|d.=l) 
EV,.|d.=l)= E(RTt)-E(Rald,= l) 
fleflexive 
(1994-1995) 
Reflexive 
(1994-1996) 
Quasi-experimental E'^(a«|d,=l)=(E(RTt)-E(RNt)]-[E(Ra|d,= l)-E(Rfi|d,= 
(1994-1995) 
CJuasi-experimental E^(oc„|d,=l)=[E(RTt)-E(RN,)I-tE(R^|d,=l)-ECRa|dr 
(1994-1996) 
Experimental 
(1994-1995) 
Experimental 
(1994-1996) 
E^(a,|d,=l)=E(RTt)-E(R.vJ 
E^(ot„|di= 1 )=E(RT J-E(Rmi) 
8.0 
(0.42) 
19.8 
(0.51) 
=0)1 9.3 
(0.53) 
=0)1 27.4 
(0.73) 
14.6 
(0.65) 
32.7 
(0.59) 
18.6 
(0.44) 
26.0 
(0.53) 
15.1 
(0.54) 
24.8 
(0.70) 
25.6 
(0.67) 
35.1 
(0.65) 
Measure of effea 
using regression 
Covariate post-test 
(1995 cross-sectional) 
Covariage post-test 
(1996 cross-sectional) 
First-diflFerence without X's 
(1994-1995) 
First-difference without X's 
(1994-1996) 
First-difference with X's 
(1994-1995) 
First-difference with X's 
(1994-1996) 
X,t Pt "t" d,ct, + U,t 
Rjt ~ Xjt Pt ^ d|Cx, + U]t 
—dctt"^Utt-LI it-i 
R„-R„.i =Xi(Pt-P.-i )+d,a,-^U„ 
22.4 33.4 
(0.04) (0.03) 
38.4 42.7 
(0.07) (0.05) 
25.5 29.9 
(0.43) (0.44) 
46.8 44.3 
(0.52) (0.54) 
12.4 20.5 
(0.54) (0.54) 
23.4 27.4 
(0.74) (0.71) 
14.6 25.6 
(0.65) (0.67) 
25.6 32.4 
(0.60) (0.66) 
22.4 33.4 
(0.04) (0.03) 
26.8 39.9 
(0.05) (0.04) 
29.2 36.7 
(0.08) (0.07) 
8.8 26.4 
(0.10) (0.08) 
42.8 46.9 
(O.ll) (0.08) 
24.2 28.1 
(0.14)(0.10) 
Note; Niraibers in parenthesis report standard errors. 
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Appendix 1 
It is our primary concern whether the fellowship program affected the distribution of 
the coefScient of the variables over time. Even though four different specifications of 
econometric models depending on the different assumptions on the stability of the 
coefficient over time and the length of the time lag were used in the first difference 
analysis, all of the results are not necessarily valid for measuring the program effect. The 
result of the stability test of coefficients in the enrollment probability reported in the table 
A.-1. Even though the hypothesis of no structural change over time was rejected, the 
fellowship program did not significantly affect the distribution of the individual 
coefficients over time. This suggests that the measurement of the program effea using 
specification without X effect terms may yield more unbiased than using specification 
with X effect terms. 
Table A-1. Stability Test of Coefficients in the Enrollment Probability Equations 
Ho ; CoeflRcients in 1994 = coefficients in 1995 
Variable 
t-value 
Bovs 
d.f.' result t-value 
Girls 
d.f. result 
income 0.821 893 not reject 0.165 937 not rejea 
age 1.907 893 not reject 1.305 937 not reject 
age square 2.213 893 not rejea 1.911 937 not reject 
mother's highest grade 0.287 893 not reject 0.7U 937 not reject 
father's highest grade 0.776 893 not reject 0.507 937 not reject 
birth order 0.345 893 not reject 0.158 937 not reject 
citizenship 0.209 893 not reject 0.507 937 not reject 
Joint Test 12.73 893 reject 11.67 937 rejea 
significance level; a = 0.05 
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Appendix 2 
It is difficult to derive income estimates for households in Pakistan. The relative 
importance of production for home consumption, informal labor market arrangements, 
barter trade and other economic activity occurring outside formal markets complicate 
income measurement. The budget for this project did not include resources sufficient to 
conduct a careful analysis of income for each household. However, the Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) had conducted such a detailed survey of household 
incomes and socioeconomic attributes in 1991. The PIHS allows us to predict household 
income based on a regression of income on easily observed household attributes. The 
current study collected information on these household attributes and then used the PIHS 
estimates to generate predicted incomes based on these attributes. 
The PIHS income equation is reported in Table A2. The specification follows that 
used by Alderman and Garcia (1996). That study estimated income and expenditure 
equations for 217 households in a single city in Balochistan. The AJderman-Garcia 
estimates can serve as independent validation of the income estimates we derive from the 
PIHS data. The Alderman-Garcia estimates are less useful for our purpose than is the 
PIHS because their data include rural households and the data are from 1986. The PIHS 
has sufficient urban observations to estimate an income equation for urban households, 
and it is chosen to our 1994 base period. The variables in the income equation include the 
number of adult males and females, the number of males and females with primary, 
secondary and tertiary level schooling, and the value of household assets. Alderman and 
Garcia found that this income specification generated predicted values that performed 
well in explaining household savings, loans, and nutrition status. 
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In general, the PIHS income estimates are sensible. Households with more capital 
assets, more human capital and more adult males have higher incomes. The results 
corresponded reasonably well in sign with those in Alderman and Garcia. More 
importantly, the two estimates generate equivalent estimates of relative household 
income. The correlation in predicted income based on the PIHS versus the Alderman-
Garcia estimates is 0.82. 
Table A2 Income Equations 
Variable Alderman and Garcia PfflS 
Intercept 5,999 3,303 
(2.61) (4.64) 
Number of males 938 1,219 
aged 16 or more (0.92) (3 73) 
Number of males 1,691 a 
aged 6-16 (2.09) 
Number of females -709 -188 
aged 16 or more (-0.54) (-0.57) 
Number of females 1,009 a 
aged 6-16 (0.64) 
Number of children 2,820 a 
5 or below (2.99) 
Number of males with 6,140 -1,171 
primary schooling (2.95) (-2.55) 
Number of males with 2.279 -364 
secondary schooling (1.69) (-0.92) 
Number of males with more 6,435 147 
than secondary schooling (1.41) (0.96) 
Number of females with 6,707 -406 
primary schooling (1.85) (-0.69) 
Number of females with 7,758 889 
middle schooling or more (1.35) (3.68) 
Rainfed land 110 b 
(2.34) 
Irrigated land 665 b 
(4.93) 
^Not available in the PIHS 
'TMot relevant for urban areas 
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Table A2. (continued) 
Variable Alderman and Garcia PfflS 
Acres of orchards 4,065 b 
(2.57) 
Value of livestock 0.335 b 
(1.05) 
Value of vehicles 0.171 0.012 
(8.55) (2.48) 
Value of machinery and tools 0.125 0.007 
(1.27) (1.88) 
0.747 0.03 
N 217 2,112 
'^'^ot relevant for urban areas 
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Notes 
' Iowa Slate University-. 
" World Bank. 
^ Statistics based on 1996 data provided by the Pakistan Education M^gement Information System. 
'' See Alderman. Orazem and Patemo (1996) for an analysis of enrollment demand for boys and girls by 
income group. 
^ Alderman. Orazem and Patemo (1996) foimd that enrollment rates in poor urban neighborhoods fell 
significantly as distance to school increased. 
^ Newman. Rawlings and Gertler (1994) found that there were very few examples of the use of randomized 
control in evaluations of social projects in developing countries since 1980. Boruch. McSweeny. and 
Soderstrom (1978) foimd that in the period before 1980, less than five percent of studies using randomized 
control in nonlaboratoi>- settings were in developing country contexts. 
The NGO, the Society for Community Support of Primary- Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB). had 
several years of experience, primarily school promotion efforts in rural communides. 
^ This eventually 1^ to an eleventh school. IDivisions in one neighborhood caused the parents to di\ide into 
two schools with half of the 100 scholarships going to each school. 
' The areas seleaed were primarily areas where squatters had established residence on government land 
that was not served by the (Juetta municipal sewer system. 
In the analysis that follows, we use multiple methods to evaluate the change in enrollment in the 
treatment neighborhoods. The conclusions are not sensitive to differences in evaluation method. Therefore, 
the potential recall bias does not drive any conclusions about program success. 
" Grossman (1994) classifies a randomly assigned counterfactual group as a "control group", and a 
nonrandomly assigned counterfactual group as a "comparison group". 
'* Newman. Rawlings. and Gertler (1994) pointed out that tests are rarely done for statistical significance of 
the differences, so that probabilities of recei\-ing the program may not be equal for individuals or 
communities in many of the evaluation smdies in developing countries. 
Since the sampling method in this study follows a cluster sampling, we applied Huber's method to correa 
for the intercorrelation problem within groups. 
Note that the estimated program effea on first difference analysis is sensitive to the stability- of the 
coefficient over time and the length of the time lag. To validate (12), it was necessary to perform a 
statistical test of stability of the coefficients over time. The result of the stability test shows that the 
distributions of the coefiBcients are not significantly changed over time due to the fellowship program. 
Further results are attached in the Appendix. 
•' The cohort-specific enrollment rates in 1994 are lower than the 1994 average for the age-specific 
analysis. The reason is that the age-specific groups average one year older in 1994. By 1996, the enrollment 
rates were higher than in the age-specific analysis because by theiu the cohort was one year older on 
average dian the age-specific sample. 
Lower average citizenship may also signal a neighborhood with greater ethnic diversity . Because the 
success of the school depended on an agreement among parents to form a comminee. divisions among 
ethnic lines may have hindered the success of the school. 
' In addition to the 100 Els. per month, each school received 200 Rs. per girl to defiay start up costs. 
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CAN CULTURAL BARRIERS BE OVERCOME IN GIRLS' 
SCHOOLING? : THE COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAM 
IN RURAL BALOCHISTAN 
A paper submitted to the World Bank Working Paper Series on Impact Evaluation of 
Education Reforms 
Jooseop BCim', Harold Alderman', and Peter F. Orazem^ 
Introduction 
Balochistan is the largest but least populous province of Pakistan. As a consequence, 
it has a higher proportion of its children living in airal areas. Increasing educational 
opportunities for rural children presents many challenges to the government. Parents are 
less educated and may see less value from schooling than do their educated urban 
counterparts. In addition, there are many uses of child time other than schooling, such as 
care and feeding livestock or chores on family plots, implying that opportunity costs for 
child time may be higher in rural areas.^ 
Even if demand for schooling were equal between mral and urban areas, there are 
serious impediments to addressing rural schooling needs. First, villages are quite remote 
with few educated adults who might meet the qualifications to teach. While urban 
residents can be assigned to teach in rural areas, teacher absenteeism increases with 
commuting distance between home and school."^ In addition, rural teachers often apply for 
transfer to urban schools, leading to high turnover among rural teachers. 
These problems are more daunting for rural girls' education. Parents prefer to have 
female teachers for their girls, but there are even fewer educated women than men who 
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could serve as teachers in rural areas. Furthermore, social taboos on female travel make it 
difficult for women teachers to commute daily from urban to niral areas. 
Constraints on the supply of rural schooling as well as weaker demand for schooling 
by rural parents have resulted in much poorer educational outcomes for rural children. 
Only 63 % of males and 25 % of females aged 10 years and older in rural areas have ever 
attended school, compared to 80 % for urban males and 57 % for urban females. The 
situation is even worse in Balochistan. Only 15 % of females aged 10 and older in 
Balochistan have ever attended school. As a consequence, the female literacy rate in 
Balochistan is only 8 %, while the literacy rate of females in urban areas is 49 %.' 
The government of Pakistan has set a goal of universal primary education by the year 
2006. Attainment of this goal will require rapid expansion of primary enrollments in rural 
areas, with particular emphasis on expansion of female primary enrollments. This study 
measures the success of such an effort to encourage female enrollments through the 
creation of community public girls' schools in rural areas of Balochistan. Ex-post 
matched comparison methods were applied to evaluate the success of the Community 
Support Process (CSP) program. 
Under the assumption that girls' education is a rationed good in the absence of a girls' 
school in the community, we treat the creation of a CSP school as a relaxation of this 
rationing constraint. We find that regardless of how the impact is measured, the CSP 
program increased girls' enrollment by an average of 22 percentage points. It also 
increased boys' enrollment by an average of 9 percentage points, suggesting that boys' 
and girls' enrollment are complementary goods. 
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The Community Support Process (CSP) Program 
From January 1992 to March 1993 an experiment to create community support for 
promotion of female primary schools was initiated in Zhob, Mekran and Naseerabad 
divisions of Balochistan. The purpose of the pilot program was to increase girls' primary 
enrollments by establishing segregated girls' primary schools taught by local female 
teachers. The program was based on a partnership between the government and the 
community. The government provided funding for the community school provided that 
the community supplied a temporary school facility, and female teacher from the 
community. A village education committee, composed of parents of daughters, was 
responsible for identifying the teacher, motivating parents to send daughters to the 
school, and monitoring the progress of the school, the children and the teacher. If the 
school was successfully operated for a probationary period, it was made a permanent 
government girls' school. 
From the start, the program design was to accommodate parental preferences by 
using female teachers from the community. Because educated females are in short-supply 
in rural areas, the educational qualifications were relaxed relative to the standard 
requirements for a government teacher. Women qualified as potential teachers if they 
had, at minimum, eight years of schooling and were residents of the same village or lived 
within walking distance of the village. To make up for lack of educational background 
and teacher training, women were given a short course in teaching methods before the 
school opened. Teachers were also given in service training afterward. Those with 
educational deficiencies were required to make them up over time. 
Theory of Enrollment Response to the Creation of CSP Girls' Schools 
Before conducting the statistical comparison of the CSP and comparison groups, it is 
important to identify the possible endogenous responses to the program. It is also 
important to identify the exogenous variables that might condition the magnitude of those 
responses. Creating girls' school in a community will alter how parents allocate resources 
between boys' schooling, girls' schooling, and other consumer goods. To illustrate the 
parents' choice, we develop a model in which households are assumed to have parents, 
daughters and sons. Parents in this model are altruistic in the sense that they are willing to 
sacrifice their own consumption to invest in their children's schooling. Parents are 
assumed to derive utility from their own consumption of goods (Z) and from the human 
capital of their daughters (Hf) and their sons (Hm). The utility function has the form 
(1) U = U(Z,Hf,H„„T), 
where T is a vector of taste indicators that are not subject to choice. 
Let Y be household income, Pz be the price of consumption goods, and Pf and Pm are 
the prices of schooling for their daughters and sons, respectively. The schooling price 
includes school fees, the cost of transportation, and the cost of materials. The income 
constraint on parental utility meiximization is 
(2) P,Z + P(Hf+PmH™ = Y. 
Now assume that schooling for girls is rationed to the amount of Sf, so that parents 
would invest more on girls' schooling if it were in sufficient supply. The supply 
constraint on parental utility maximization is 
(3) Hf<Sf. 
The parents allocate their household income to Z, Hm, and Hf in order to maximize 
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utility given by (1), subject to PzZ + PfHf+ PmHn, = Y and Hf< Sf. The first order 
conditions are 
C"^) Um - APm < 0 or Hn,=0 
(5) Uf-XPf-|a< OorHpO 
(6) Uz -XP^ = 0 
(7) Y-P„,H„,-PfHf-P,Z = 0 
(8) Sf-Hf>0, 
where X and p. are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with household budget and girls' 
school supply, respectively. If the constraints bind, the multipliers will be positive. When 
the constraint is binding (i.e., |j. > 0 and Hf > 0, and equation (5) holds with equality) and 
the prices for boys' and girls' schooling are the same, equations (4) and (5) imply Uf >Um-
Diminishing marginal utility would then imply that Hm > Hf at the optimum. 
The CSP program relaxes the restrictions on girls schooling.^ The effect of the 
program on the girls schooling comes directly from total differentiation of equation (8) as 
follows: 
(8)' dHf/dSf=l. 
This implies that a marginal increase on the rationed amount of girls' schooling will 
raise girls' enrollment by the same amount. Totally differentiating equations (4) through 
(7) and inserting dHf = dSf, we get the following comparative static results: 
(9) ^ = U^PfP. + UfvP^P. - a.P..Pf- U^fP.= 
dSf |H| 
(10) dHm= -U^P. + U^P^ 
dV |Hi 
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where |H| = -ZUmzPm + UzzPm" + UmmPz' < 0. From equations (9) and (10), we get 
( 1 1 )  d H n ,  =  - P f  d H ^  +  P.nJg,P^ - U^fP.) 
dSf dY |H| 
Assuming diminishing marginal utility, Uii < 0 for i = m, f, and z. Hence, from 
equation (10), we can see the income effect depends on the sign and magnitudes of Umz 
and Uzz. However, numerous studies suggest that education is a normal good so that 
equation (10) is positive. The effect of the program on boys' schooling is ambiguous. 
Equation (11) shows that the effect can be decomposed into an income effect and another 
term, ft is apparent that the effect of relaxing rationing of girls' schooling imposes a cost 
on the household which can lower boys' schooling through the income effect. The 
program lowers net income available for other purposes including boys' schooling. 
However, we can see that under some circumstances, the creation of a girls' school can 
lead to an increase in boys' schooling as well. If this happens, we can conclude that boys' 
and girls' education are complements. Boys' and girls' education are more likely to be 
complements when the price of girls' schooling is low so that Pf = 0. In addition, they are 
more likely to be complements when Umf > 0 and/or when Ufe < 0 The first condition 
implies that the marginal utility from boys' schooling increases at higher levels of girls' 
schooling. The second implies that the marginal utility of consumer goods decreases as 
girls' schooling rises. 
Reduced form equations for boys' and girls' schooling have the following functional 
forms; 
(12) Hf=Hf(Pf, Pm, Y,Pz,T, Sf) 
(13) H„, = Hm(P„,Pf, Y,Pz,T,Sf) 
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The reduced form equations suggest that enrollment will depend on school fees, income, 
the price level, tastes, and the available supply of girls' schooling. 
Survey Design and Data Strategy 
To evaluate the enrollment effect of the CSP schools, we required a comparison 
group of villages without CSP schools. A sample of villages was drawn from the 1990 
Balochistan Human Resources Survey. This survey contained information on useful 
village attributes including the number and type of schools in the village, and the 
population of girls and boys. Villages of size comparable to the CSP village without a 
girls' school were taken to be potential comparison villages. A total of 30 villages in three 
divisions were selected by the Balochistan Education Management Information System 
(BEMIS). Three villages with CSP schools in each division were also drawn from lists of 
CSP schools. 
For each CSP and comparison village, household information was collected by 
BEMIS in the same manner to insure comparability. The household survey information 
included socioeconomic characteristics of each household including parental education 
and occupation, age, gender, educational attainment and current enrollment status for all 
children in the household. 
Differences and Similarities Between Treatment and Comparison 
Group 
To begin the analysis, we investigate whether the comparison and CSP villages are 
statistically similar. Statistical properties are summarized in Table 1 for both treatment 
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and comparison groups. Sample statistics are reported separately for boys and girls. The 
treatment sample included 355 children, 175 girls and 180 boys. The comparison sample 
included 1,023 children, 595 girls and 428 boys. Enrollment rates for both boys and girls 
are higher in the treatment than in the comparison group, a first-pass estimate of the 
impact of the CSP school effect. Nevertheless, there may be other factors responsible for 
the higher CSP village enrollments. The other variables in Table 1 are those believed to 
affect parental enrollment choices for their children. Children's age, father's education 
attainment, and birth order of the child in a family were taken directly fi"om the survey 
data. There was information on mother's education attainment in the survey data, but 
almost all the mothers had never attended school. Lack of variation in mother's education 
led to exclusion from the analysis. Household income was generated from information on 
the number and educational attainment of adults in the household, land holdings, and 
other productive household assets. Details on the estimated measure of household income 
are contained in the Appendix. 
We performed two different tests of the equivalence between the CSP and 
comparison villages. One is an equality test of means in characteristics between the 
treatment and the comparison groups. This test provides information on how closely the 
comparison villages match the treatment villages. The other test examines whether the 
behavioral coefficients in the enrollment choice model (based on equation (14)) are equal 
between the treatment and the comparison villages. 
Tests of Equality of Means 
The third and sixth columns of Table 1 report corrected t-values and degrees of 
freedom for hypothesis tests that the means of the variables are equal across the treatment 
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and the comparison groups. The sample statistics for boys were statistically equivalent. 
For girls, fathers were more educated in the CSP villages. Birth order was also 
significantly larger in the CSP villages, implying somewhat larger numbers of children 
per household. Nevertheless, the joint test that the means were equal across all variables 
other than the enrollment rate was not rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. Based 
upon the results, we can reach a statistical conclusion that the treatment and comparison 
samples are drawn from the same universe of villages. 
Test of Equality of Behavioral Coefficients in the Enrollment Choice Model 
Parental decision-making regarding their children's education may differ between 
the treatment and comparison group. To check this, we estimate the following model of 
parental choice regarding their children's schooling; 
(14) R.* = |3% + Ui 
where R; = 1 ifRj*>0 
R, = 0 ifR,* <0 
In equation (14), an unobserved variable R4* depends on the index function, P'X„ 
where X, is the vector of characteristics in equations (12) and (13) which affect children's 
enrollment. When Rj* is positive, we observe the child in school and R,= 1. Otherwise, the 
child will not enroll. 
Table 2 A reports the coefficients and z values of the probit analysis of enrollment 
choices for boys and girls. Separate estimates are presented for the treatment and the 
comparison groups. All of the estimates exhibit the same sign pattern of coefficients with 
the exception of the generally small and imprecisely estimated coefficients on birth order 
for boys and girls. The coefficient on household income is positive in both samples. 
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Parental education also positively influences children's enrollment. Enrollment increases 
with age, but at a diminishing rate. 
Table 2B shows the result of the tests of equality of coefficients between the 
treatment and the comparison groups. The coefficients for the two groups are not 
statistically different, except for father's educational level in the enrollment equation for 
girls. In addition, the joint test of equality of behavioral coefficients across the CSP and 
comparison villages does not reject the null hypothesis of equality for the girls sample, 
while it was rejected for the boys' sample and the pooled sample. This result suggests that 
the patterns of the parental decision-making regarding their girl's education are identical 
in the treatment and the comparison groups. It should be emphasized, however, that in 
this ex post design, the tests of equality is not definitive. If the implementation of the CSP 
schools changed parental behavior, then ex ante identical groups will look different ex 
post. Therefore, the previous test of equality of time invariant household attributes is 
more relevant. 
Evaluation Strategy 
Accuracy of a quantified impact evaluation depends mainly on how well the 
comparison group was constructed. Since a child i cannot be simultaneously in both the 
treatment state (RiO and the non-treatment state (Roi) of the CSP program, we cannot 
observe the true impact of the program a; = Ri; - Ro,. Instead, the observed outcome (Ri), 
can be expressed as R; = di Ru + (l-d,)Roi, where di =l if child i lives in a CSP village. 
Given the impossibility of observing the true impact of the fellowship program, the goal 
is to get an unbiased estimator of a;. 
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One way to get an unbiased estimator of tti is to use a comparison group to derive 
estimates of the counterfactual state. If we have a comparison group that mimics the 
treatment group very welL, the comparison group is a good proxy for the counterfactual 
state of the CSP program. In this case, the expected program effect can be measured by 
the gap between the post program outcome in the treatment group and that in the 
comparison group. Mathematically, this is defined as 
(15) Matched comparison: E*^(ai|di=l) =E(RT)-E(RC) 
where subscripts T and C represent treatment group and comparison group, respectively. 
This method is called the ex-post matched comparison method. 
Another way to get an unbiased estimator of ai is to fit the following econometric 
model assuming the effect is invariant across individuals: 
(16) Covariate post-test: R, = Xjp dia + Ui 
Equation (16) is the same as equation (14) except for the addition of a dummy variable 
indicating residence in a CSP village. Assuming X, and dj are independent of the 
unobserved variables U,, so that ECUi | di, Xi) = 0 for all 1, we can estimate equation (16) 
using a cross-sectional data set. 
Results 
The first row of the Table 1 presents the enrollment rates of the treatment and the 
comparison group three years after the program intervention. Applying the ex-post 
matched comparison method given by equation (15), the measured CSP program effect 
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was to increase girls' primary enrollment by 20.8 % and to increase boys' primary 
enrollment by 9.5 %. 
The covariate post-test results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the results from 
the ex-post matched comparison method. The measured effect of the CSP program, based 
on equation (16), is a 21.8 % increase in girls' enrollment and a 12.9 % increase of boys' 
enrollment. The other estimated parameters exhibit the same sign patterns in the CSP and 
comparison enrollment choice equations for both girls and boys. The magnitudes are also 
comparable. Moreover, the coefficients are consistent with the results obtained in other 
studies of enrollment. The coefficient on household income is positive in both samples, 
so education of children is a normal good. Father's education level positively influences 
children's enrollment. Child age also positively affeas enrollment choice, but at a 
decreasing rate. Peak enrollment for girls occurs 1.5 years below boys and drops off 
faster, so girls have smaller projected time in school. First-bom children have a slightly 
higher probability of enrollment than their younger siblings, but the coefficient is not 
significant. 
Income elasticities based on the coefficient of income in Table 3 and means of 
household income in Table 1 were 0.044 for boys and 0.049 for girls, which are highly 
inelastic.^ This implies that income growth in rural areas does not guarantee an increase 
in primary enrollments. This also predicts that an alternative program, which aims to 
increase attendance through an income subsidy to households, will not be effective. 
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Conclusions and Extensions 
There has been concern that the provision of a girls' school can boost girls schooling 
in the rural areas only if there is excess demand for girls' schooling. A pessimistic view is 
that cultural barriers or lack of parental interest about girls' schooling prevail in rural 
areas. Parents would not send their girls to school, even if more girls' schools are 
provided. However, this study shows that the creation of the CSP schools led to a 
substantial increase in attendance for rural girls. Although the reason for the success 
carmot be identified from available data, the use of parental participation and local female 
teachers are apparently critical to breaking cultural barriers to female schooling. An 
interesting side benefit of the program is that boys' enrollment also increased. The 
program effect on boys' enrollment is apparently due to an underlying complementarity 
between boys' and girls' schooling so that relaxing the constraint on girls' schools also 
raises incentives to send boys to school. The results were not sensitive to the methods 
used to measure the program effect based on different assumptions. All of the results 
suggest that expanding the CSP program to other villages is a promising strateg>' to raise 
rural schooling. 
Future work of impact evaluation on CSP program will be required to assess the 
performance of the children attending CSP schools. The ultimate goal of the CSP 
program is to make children attain literacy. It would also be useful to compare 
educational outcomes in CSP schools to educational outcomes in traditional government 
schools. In particular, the role of local parental control may be an important factor in 
making all schools more effective and not just girls' schools. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Datasets and Tests of the Equality of Means 
Between the CSP and Comparison Groups 
Variable Girls Boys 
CSP Comparison t-value CSP Comparison t-value 
Enrollment rate 0.623 0.415 5.546 0.761 0.666 2.844 
(0.486) (0.493) [768] (0.428) (0.472) [606] 
Household income 3197 5143 1.878 3675 6871 0.767 
(6476) (8323) [768] (6552) (14178) [606] 
Age 7.411 7.401 0.717 7.437 7.439 0.087 
(1.762) (1.725) [768] (1.804) (1.717) [606] 
Father's education 2.280 1.404 3.679 1.781 1.595 1.917 
(4.116) (3.235) [735] (3.537) (3.502) [586] 
Birth order 3.040 2.417 2.149 2.972 2.626 1.017 
(1.468) (1.273) [768] (1.508) (1.245) [605] 
Joint test 12.99 4.89 
Number of observations 175 595 180 428 
Note; Critical value for joint test is 13.5. 
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Table 2 A Probit Analysis of the Probability of Enrollment by Gender and Village Type 
Variable Giris and Bovs Girls Bovs 
CSP Comparison CSP Comparison CSP Comparison 
Income/10000 0.269 0.111 0.212 0.115 0.324 0.146 
(1.04) (3.43) (0.87) (1.11) (1.08) (4.46) 
Age 0.782 1.471 0.501 1.296 1.171 1.724 
(13.5) (7.79) (3.29) (6.13) (3.80) (31.0) 
Age square -0.043 -0.087 -0.029 -0.082 -0.064 -0.091 
(31.3) (9.24) (2.14) (7.48) (2.80) (22.0) 
Father's education 0.078 0.058 0.087 0.045 0.061 0.091 
(3.37) (1.63) (2.43) (1.34) (1.79) (2.15) 
Birth order -0.053 -0.026 -0.084 0.007 0.003 -0,080 
(0.76) (0.82) (2.56) (0.11) (0.03) (2.68) 
Girl -0.456 -0.663 
(1.64) (14.3) 
Constant -2.577 -5.536 -1.709 -5.204 -4.389 -7.018 
(3.88) (4.96) (3.35) (3.88) (3.64) (14.0) 
Number of 353 972 175 562 178 410 
Observations 
Pseudo R" 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.21 
Variable Girls and Bovs Giris Boi fS  
X" result r  result X" result 
Income 0.38 not reject 0.15 not rejea 0.51 not reject 
Age 0.29 not reject 0.49 not reject 1.04 not reject 
Age square 0.29 not reject 0.12 not reject 5.68 not reject 
Father's education 5.72 not reject 14.36 reject 0.58 not reject 
Birth order 0.01 not rejea 0.86 not reject 1.49 not reject 
Girl 0.47 not reject 
Joint test 7.83 reject 3.39 not reject 8.24 reject 
Significance level; a = 0.05 
Note: The critical value for the joint test is 6.88. 
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Table 3 Post-test Probit Analysis of Probability of Enrollment Using Cross-sectional Data 
Variable Girls and Bovs Girls Boys 
CSP dummy 0.182 0.218 0.129 
(5.55) (4.77) (3.06) 
Income/10000 0.050 0.048 0.052 
(2.84) (1.95) (2.15) 
Age 0,495 0.428 0.498 
(5.88) (3.92) (4.23) 
Age square -0.029 -0.027 -0.026 
(5.20) (3.74) (3.38) 
Father's education 0.025 0.023 0.026 
(5.58) (3.97) (3.75) 
Birth order -0.015 -0.010 -0.015 
(1.26) (0.67) (0.93) 
Girl -0.234 
(8.16) 
Number of 1325 737 588 
Observations 
Pseudo R" 0.13 0,06 0.18 
Note; The coefficients reported iiere are dF/dX, where F is dependent variable and X is 
independent variable, not actual coefficients. Since the dependent variable is a discrete 
variable, dF/dX is not identical to actual coefficients. 
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Appendix 
Estimation of household income requires information on household production, 
informal labor market arrangements, barter trade and other economic activities occurring 
outside formal markets. That type of information is difficult and costly to obtain. This 
project did not include sufficient resources to measure household income accurately. 
Instead, we utilized the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS), which contained a 
detailed survey of household income and socioeconomic attributes in 1991. The PIHS 
allows us to predict household income based on a regression of income on easily 
observed household attributes. The current study collected information on these 
household attributes and then used the PIHS estimates to generate predicted incomes 
based on those attributes. 
The PEHS income equation is reported in Table A. The specification follows that 
used by Alderman and Garcia (1996). That study estimated income and expenditure 
equations for 217 households in a single city in Balochistan. The predicted household 
income using .AJderman-Garcia estimates performed well in explaining household 
savings, loans, and nutrition status in their study. However, the Alderman-Garcia 
estimates are less useful for our purpose because their data are from 1986 and some of the 
variables in their data do not match very well with the survey data for our current study. 
The variables in the income equation include the number of adult males and females, the 
number of males and females with primary, secondary and tertiary level schooling, and 
the value of household assets. As can be seen in Table A, households with more adult 
males, more human capital, and more capital assets have higher income in both the PEHS 
data and the data used in Alderman-Garcia's study. 
Table A Income Equations 
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Variable Alderman and Garcia PIHS, rural 
Intercept 5,999 -777 
(2.61) (-6.39) 
Number of males 938 541 
aged 16 or more (0.92) (4.37) 
Number of males 1,691 a 
aged 6-16 (2.09) 
Number of females -709 315 
aged 16 or more (-0.54) (2.59) 
Number of females 1,009 a 
aged 6-16 (0.64) 
Number of children 2.820 a 
5 or below (2.99) 
Number of males with 6,140 121 
primary schooling (2.95) (0.69) 
Number of males with 2,279 960 
secondary schooling (1.69) (5.60) 
Number of males with more 6,435 449 
than secondary schooling (1.41) (4.65) 
Number of females with 6,707 -427 
primary schooling (1.85) (-1.88) 
Number of females with 7,758 747 
middle schooling or more (1.35) (5.87) 
Value of land/1,000 1.24 
(10.97) 
Rainfed land 110 a 
(2.34) 
Irrigated land 665 a 
(4.93) 
Orchards'' 4,065 196 
(2.57) (1.55) 
Value of livestock 0.335 a 
(1.05) 
Cow'"" 62.1 
(1.88) 
Camel' 955 
(2.19) 
Donkey/horse" 9.45 
(0.04) 
Goat/sheep" 11.8 
(0.65) 
Value of vehicles 0.171 0.03 
(8.55) (2.95) 
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Table A Income Equations (continued) 
Variable Alderman and Garcia PIHS, rural 
Value of machinery and tools 0.125 0.02 
(1.27) (1.31) 
R- 0.747 0.430 
N 217 894 
^ot available in the current data 
"^nit is acres for Alderman-Garcia, and value for PIHS 
"Unit is the total number owned 
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Notes 
' Iowa State University. 
" World Bank. 
 ^ According to ttie Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS), 39 % of rural Balochistan boys who 
never anended school were withheld because they had to help at home. The corresponding figure was 23 % 
in urban Balochistan. 
•* Orazenu Patemo and Guttierez (1995) found that female teacher absenteeism decreases if teacher was 
single, did not have young childre. lived closer to the school, or was paid better. 
 ^Statistics based on 1995-1996 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey. 
 ^ This is a special case of rationing in the sense that only one good is rationed. Tobin and Houthakker 
(1951) analyzed more general case of effects of rationing. 
According to Kim. Alderman and Orazem (1998). the corresponding elasticities were 0.115 for boys and 
0.503 for girls in urban Balochistan. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Two educational pilot projects for improving girls' enrollment were implemented in 
the urban and rural areas of Balochistan in Pakistan. This study evaluates those pilot 
projects, and provides quantitative evidence forjudging whether or not to expand those 
projects. The most important finding is that low girls' enrollment was not due entirely to 
cultural barriers which caused parents to withhold their daughters from school. Both the 
urban and rural studies show that increasing girls' access to schooling can dramatically 
increase girls' enrollment. 
In the urban fellowship study, it is shown that the fellowship program has positively 
affected enrollment for both boys and girls. The estimated impact was robust to different 
estimation methods. Most show that the effect was larger for girls' enrollment. The results 
of the urban fellowship experiment provide strong evidence that subsidizing the 
establishment of girls' private primary schools can lead to sharp increases in girls' 
enrollment. In addition, even though the fellowship was given only to girls, boys' 
enrollment in those neighborhoods also sharply increased. This suggests that the program 
may have created a low price for boys' schooling, or there also may have been excess 
demand for boys' primary education in these poor areas, or boys' and girls' education are 
complements. 
The measured change over two years yielded mixed evidence on whether the 
enrollment growth advantage in fellowship neighborhoods over control neighborhoods 
continued to grow over time. However, even if the initial enrollment gain relative to 
control neighborhoods decreased in subsequent years, the enrollment gains after two 
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years are still around 25 percentage points. School success appears not to depend on 
neighborhood income or other observable socioeconomic variables, suggesting that 
expansion of the program to other poor neighborhoods is also likely to be successful. 
The rural CSP study also shows that the creation of a girls' school in a rural 
community leads to substantial increase in attendance for both boys and girls. The large 
growth in girls' enrollment supports the view that access to girls' schooling is rationed in 
rural areas. The program effect on boys' enrollment was smaller than the effect on girls, 
but the positive impact suggest that boys' and girls' education are complements. By 
exploiting this complementarity, the government can raise literacy for both boys and girls 
by expanding educational opportunities for girls. The results were not sensitive to the 
methods used to measure the program effect based on different assumptions. All of the 
results suggest that expanding the CSP program promise to be successful. 
Future work will be required to assess each project's effects on school outcomes. The 
ultimate success of the primary educational projects depends on whether children attain 
literacy. It may be useful to assess children's performance before and after the program 
intervention between the treatment and control (or comparison) groups. Another way of 
doing this may be to compare the program outcomes among different types of 
educational projects, and to investigate the reason why they yield different outcomes. 
Cost effectiveness of projects must also be assessed in future work. Since the 
resources for education projects are limited, it is important to find the most efficient way 
to raise enrollments and literacy for both boys and girls. 
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
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Table 1. Enrollment Rate by Year and Age (Urban) 
Age 
1994 
Treatment Control 
1995 
Treatment Control 
1996 
Treatment Control 
Boys 
3 years 3.9 0 a 3.0 a a 
4 years 11.5 2.6 12.0 2.4 a 4.5 
5 years 22.6 28.1 32.9 23.9 48.7 12.5 
6 years 50.6 55.3 56.5 41.2 73.3 35.0 
7 years 67.4 59.3 78.9 62.1 89.3 60.3 
8 years 77.7 69.7 85.6 69.4 89.0 71.8 
9 years 76.4 68.3 90.7 78.8 88.7 71,9 
10 years 87.1 a 90.1 74.7 87.4 72.7 
Girls 
3 years 9.1 1.5 a 1.7 a a ; 
: 
4 years 
, 
8.8 8.9 23.4 2.3 a J.J 
5 years 29.7 21.5 35.4 20.9 45.5 18.2 
6 years 39.2 39.6 60.5 32.2 69.0 35.7 
7 years 53.6 46.0 71.8 50.5 78.1 41.6 
8 years 60.0 36.0 81.5 50.4 78.3 53.1 
9 years j 86.0 46.6 73.9 46.0 80.8 54.0 
i 
10 years | 75.3 a 94.7 49.2 76.3 41.3 
Not available in the current data set. 
Note: Table 1.shows the enrollment rate by year and age for both boys and girls. These 
numbers are used to calculate the program effect with either age specific and cohort 
specific sample in the context. We can get additional benefits in analysis from the above 
table. First, by applying the quasi-experimental method, we can see the change in 
enrollment due to the program is bigger in younger age group for both boys and girls. 
Second, we can calculate the program effect on enrollment for children excluded in the 
sample, who were aged less than four and more than eight. The effect was also bigger in 
younger age group, and the interpretation is substantially the same as in the context. 
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Table 2 Enrollment Rate Before and After the Program by Neighborhood (Urban) 
Neighborhood Name Treatment Control 
Before After Gap Before After Gap 
Boys 
Pashtoon Abad 46.9 100.0 53.1 46.5 36.5 -10.0 
Brewery Road 44.4 85.7 41.3 77.1 59.0 -18.2 
Almo/Shabo 44.4 58.3 13.9 52.2 43.1 - 9.1 
Nawa Killi 43.2 72.7 29.5 33.3 17.9 -15.5 
Samungali 42.0 100.0 58.0 27.8 20.0 - 7.8 
Hudda 48.9 100.0 51.1 46.5 53.7 7.2 
Marriabad 43.6 96.0 52.5 81.6 63.0 -18.6 
Kechi Baig 29.2 64.3 35.1 55.6 49.0 - 6.6 
Irrigation Colony 60.0 85.7 25.7 34.8 38.2 3.4 
Killi Sheikhan 39.0 95.2 56.2 59.5 60.5 l.O 
Girls 
Pashtoon Abad 55.2 94.1 38.9 jj.j 27.3 -6.0 
Brewery Road 47.1 88.1 41.0 52.1 67.4 15.4 
Almo/Shabo 42.4 jj.j -9.0 28.9 41.7 12.8 
Nawa Killi 55.2 62,5 7.3 4.4 6.0 1,6 
Samungali 45.0 91.3 46.3 10.0 16.7 6.7 
Hudda 47.4 100.0 53.6 35.3 42.9 7.6 
Marriabad 42.9 100.0 57.1 64.2 69.2 5.0 
Kechi Baig 30.9 64.0 33.1 29.8 28.1 - 1.7 
Irrigation Colony 61.4 100.0 38.6 23.9 12.3 -11.6 
Killi Sheikhan 50.0 97.3 47.3 58.3 57.5 -0.8 
Note: An attempt to calculate the neighborhood specific program effects has been made 
Table 2 reports the change of average enrollment rate from 1994 to 1996 for both boys 
and girls. It shows that there exists considerable variation in enrollment growth of both 
genders across neighborhoods. For example, changes in control group enrollment rates 
for boys varied from 18.6 % decline in Marriabad to a 7.2 % increase in Hudda. Even 
larger differences in enrollment growth occur in the target neighborhoods. Girls' 
enrollment changed from a 9.0 % decline in Almo\Shabo to a 57.1 % increase in 
Marriabad. 
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Table 3. Correlation between Program Effect and Neighborhood Characteristics 
(Urban) 
Program Average Average Average Average 
Effect Income Mother's Father's Cost 
Education Education 
Boys 
Pashtoon Abad 63.0 (3) 4 4 6 6 
Brewery Road 59.4 (4) J 1 7 4 
Almo/Shabo 22.9 (9) 8 9 9 2 
Nawa Killi 45.0 (6) 1 6 1 9 
Samungali 65.8 (2) 7 9 10 I 
Hudda 43.9 (7) 5 2 2 7 
Marriabad 71.0(1) 9 J 8 5 
Kechi Baig 41.7(8) 6 7 4 10 
Irrigation Colony 22.3 (10) 10 5 J 8 
Killi Sheikhan 55.3 (5) 2 8 5 J 
Girls 
Pashtoon Abad 45.0 (5) 5 7 5 J 
Brewery Road 25.7 (8) J 6 9 6 
Almo/Shabo -21.8(10) 9 9 8 2 
Nawa Killi 5.6 (9) 1 3 7 8 
Samungali 39.6 (6) 6 9 10 I 
Hudda 45.1 (4) 4 5 3 7 
Marriabad 52.1(1) 8 1 6 5 
Kechi Baig 34.8 (7) 7 4 4 10 
Irrigation Colony 50.3 (2) 10 2 1 9 
Killi Sheikhan 48.2 (3) 2 8 7 4 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in the parenthesis represent ranking of the measured effect. 
2. Measured program effect is subject to Quasi-experimental method (1994-1996) 
3. Numbers other than program effect indicate rankings with ascending order. For 
example, average cost for boys and girls education is highest in the Samungali 
neighborhood. 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
4. It is hard to pinpoint why the enroihnent rate grew in some neighborhoods and 
declined in others. Table 3. report rank orderings of neighborhood averages of 
parent's education, income, and school cost (before the fellowship schools opened). 
Given there are only ten neighborhoods, this type of analysis is suggestive at best. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that income is not critical - some of the poorest 
neighborhoods (Marriabad, Irrigation Colony) were among the most successful 
while some of the richest were not successful at all (Almo/ Shabo). Similarly, it is 
difficult to see a link between enrollment growth and average education or schooling 
costs in the neighborhood. 
Table 4. Enrollment Rate by Age and Sex (Rural) 
Age Treatment 
Boys 
Comparison Treatment 
Girls 
Comparison 
5 years 51.4 26.9 57.9 28.7 
6 years 75.0 48.9 54.6 39.4 
7 years 80.0 75.7 60.0 48.5 
8 years 78.6 79,1 74.4 47.5 
9 years 100.0 88.9 42.9 59.7 
10 years 85.4 85.9 66.7 33.9 
Note: Table 4 shows the gap of enrollment rate between the treatment and comparison 
group is larger in younger age group for boys, but does vary not much for girls except age 
9. It suggests that the program has positively affected the new entrance of boys, while it 
has positively affected enrollment for entire age group of girls. However, it remains as a 
puzzle why the effea was negative for girls aged 9. 
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